

JPRS 84353

19 September 1983

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

No. 2847



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

19 September 1983

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

No. 2847

## CONTENTS

## CAMEROON

Analysis of New Biya Regime Provided (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 16, 3 Aug 83) .....	1
Briefs	
Cameroon Bank Appointments	7
Military Changes	7
Douala Airport Security	7
Fake Bank Warning	8
LNG Set-Back	8

## CHAD

Only Hope in Situation Reportedly To Secure New Negotiation (WEST AFRICA, No 3445 22 Aug 83) .....	9
---	---

## CONGO

Problems Facing Economic Development Program, Oil Industry (Howard Scheissel; WEST AFRICA, various dates).....	11
---	----

## GAMBIA

SENEGAMBIA SUN's First Issue Published (LE SOLEIL, 1 Aug 83) .....	17
---	----

## NAMIBIA

Trans-Namibia Airline To Shut Down (WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 27 Aug 83) .....	18
S. Africa Accused of Shabby Treatment of Namibian Press (Editorial; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 27 Aug 83) .....	20
Columnist Analyzes Party Positions Vis a Vis UN (WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 27 Aug 83) .....	22

## NIGERIA

Announcing Incorrect Election Results (WEST AFRICA, No 3445, 22 Aug 83) .....	25
Failure of Agriculture Scheme Blamed on NPN (DAILY TIMES, 1 Aug 83) .....	26
FEDECO Head Promises Investigation of Alleged Malpractices (WEST AFRICA, No 3445, 27 Aug 83) .....	27
Ethnic Distrusts Exploited in Rivers State Politics (WEST AFRICA, No 3442, 1 Aug 83) .....	28
Constitution Considered in Light of Elections (WEST AFRICA, No 3443, 8 Aug 83) .....	32
Analysis of Shagari's Victory Provided (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 17, 17 Aug 83) .....	34
Briefs	
PRC, USSR Cultural Agreements .....	44

## SENEGAL

Rapprochement With Some Opposition Parties Possible (Pierre Biarnes; LE MONDE, 27 Jul 83) .....	45
Government Taking Measures To Overcome Drought's Effects (LE SOLEIL, 3 Aug 83) .....	47

## ZAIRE

Public Bus Transportation System Discussed (Howard Schissel; WEST AFRICA, No 3446, 29 Aug 83) .....	49
--	----

## ZAMBIA

Water Shortage in Ndola Rural Reaches 'Alarming Proportions' (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 1 Sep 83) .....	52
Mundia Opens Workshop in Lusaka on Biogas Systems (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 31 Aug 83) .....	53
Soldiers Placed Along Ndola-Mufulira Road To Minimize Robberies (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 30 Aug 83) .....	54
Illegal Currency Exchange Between Zambians-Zimbabweans 'Rife' (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 30 Aug 83) .....	55
ZCCM Official Announces Increased Salaries for ZCCM Members (George Makulu; DAILY MAIL, 1 Sep 83) .....	56



Goma Says Nation Benefits Enormously From Indian Cooperation (DAILY MAIL, 1 Sep 83) .....	58
Kaunda Scores Fiscal Indiscipline in National Missions Abroad (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 1 Sep 83) .....	59
Briefs	
Japanese Veterinary School Grant	60
Three Expatriate Miners Fired	60

## ANALYSIS OF NEW BIYA REGIME PROVIDED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 16, 3 Aug 83 pp 1-3

[Article: "Cameroun: To Biya Not To Be?"]

[Text]

Political tension in Yaoundé remains high following President Paul Biya's surprise June cabinet reshuffle which sidelined many of the key stalwarts of former President Ahmadou Ahidjo. By announcing the reshuffle on the eve of the state visit by President François Mitterrand he pre-empted any counter-attack by pro-Ahidjo potentates. Mitterrand probably advised Ahidjo that France was throwing its weight behind Biya and that attempts to destabilise Biya would risk placing in jeopardy Ahidjo's political heritage. However, the struggle between Biya and Ahidjo is far from over.

It now transpires that when Ahidjo voluntarily relinquished office at the end of last year (AC Vol. 23 No. 23) he was indeed seriously concerned about his health. Having resigned, he moderated his drinking and stopped chain-smoking. His health consequently improved to the point where he apparently considered reassuming the presidency.

During the first few months Ahidjo tended to support Biya, as was evident during the Moussa Yaya affair. Ahidjo's brother-in-law and a powerful Fulani notable, Yaya tried to rally northern businessmen against Biya, and even contemplated having northern Cameroun secede and join with federal Nigeria. The affair came to a head in a January politburo meeting of the ruling *Union Nationale Camerounaise* (UNC) presided over by Ahidjo. Yaya and two other MPs were sacked from the party. Other barons similarly contriving against Biya were thus smartly discouraged. Not until early spring did Ahidjo attempt to capitalise on his position as secretary-general of the party in order to counter Biya.

By April it was apparent that Ahidjo was intent on a come-back. It seemed that he would at least try to have one of his protégés, such as prime

minister **Bello Bôuba Maigari**, installed in the presidency. In June he tried to introduce before a UNC politburo meeting two important constitutional amendments: officially to declare a one-party state; and to establish the UNC's power to select a national president. So long as Ahidjo and his followers control most of the key party positions the above proposed amendments would clearly have narrowed Biya's room for manoeuvre and put Ahidjo in the running for the 1985 presidential nomination. Biya's cabinet reshuffle, which was regarded by Ahidjo's supporters as an unofficial declaration of war, then put an end to most of the above machinations.

So far Biya has not stretched his powers to the full. He is now under pressure to do so, particularly by the southerners, who want a decisive end to the Ahidjo era. It is increasingly suggested to Biya that he now embark on a vigorous anti-corruption drive - a net that could undoubtedly catch many northern businessmen of the *ancien régime* who still form the core of Ahidjo's support. It would anyhow appear that the government-controlled daily newspaper, *Cameroun Tribune*, is in a position to "discover" a series of illicit dealings involving northern businessmen and Bamiléké businessmen from the south.

The three cabinet reshuffles during the last nine months have been characterised by the nomination of ambitious southern technocrats of the 35-50 year-old generation, the dismissal of some potentates closely associated with Ahidjo, and a reinforcing of the prime minister's position by making him the coordinator of all economic policy-making and execution. In Biya's first cabinet, formed last November, the emphasis was on maintaining the essential outline of the regional power balance. Thus, with a southern president for the first time since independence in 1960, a northerner automatically became prime minister, and a northerner, **Sadou Daoudou** (an Ahidjo henchman and minister of the armed forces for 19 years), was appointed to the key position of secretary-general of the president's office, replacing a southerner, **Samuel Eboua**. The latter hails from the Moungo region, administratively attached to the littoral province, and was the pillar of Ahidjo's support in the southern part of the country. Eboua was even considered as a potential Ahidjo *dauphin*. Putting him into the post of minister of agriculture removed him from the inner circle.

Biya also broadened the system of having four state ministers at the pinnacle of the cabinet hierarchy, each representing a key region in the country, by appointing Eboua as a fifth state minister - a move that could also have been interpreted as a means of forestalling Eboua's waning political career. The other state ministers were **Paul Dongsop**, representing the west, **Emmanuel Egbe Tabi**,

English-speaking Cameroun, **Abdoulaye Maikano**, the north, and **Victor Ayissi Mvodo**, the centre-south. Another subtle and little-noticed initiative undertaken at the time was the breaking down of the regional monopoly over a number of cabinet portfolios. The north, for instance, considered the ministerial posts for the administration as its exclusive preserve. The west jealously hung onto foreign affairs, supplies, labour and telecommunications. English-speaking Cameroun, for example, considered the transport ministry and mines and energy (most of the oil is offshore anglophone Cameroun) as its domain. Biya skillfully named one of his associates from the centre-south, **Pierre Désiré Engo**, to the post of minister of the economy, and another politician from the centre-south, **Felix Tonye Mbog**, as minister of labour. This was an important harbinger of more radical change to come.

#### **Forward with the technocrats**

The "technical" reshuffle in April was also more consequential than generally accredited. Biya reinforced the technocratic and southern component (especially from his own centre-south region) of the regime, while easing to the sidelines older politicians who owed their office simply to tribal connections or loyalty to Ahidjo. Four ministers were sacked: foreign minister Paul Donsop, finance minister **Gilbert Ntang** (who we hear could be named to head the financially troubled *Cameroun Airlines*, CAMAIR), minister of economy Engo and **Joseph Charles Doumba**, minister with special duties at the presidency. All those retired were from the south, so the northerners were unperturbed.

Biya then set about promoting his young technocrats. The ministry of economy and planning was split up, with the planning function going to **Gilbering Bol Alima**, a 39-year-old technocrat from the Bafia region and a former dean of the *Dschang Agricultural University*. Deputy planning minister **Elizabeth Tankou** is from an important Bamiléké commercial family and has influential contacts in the business community. As noted above, prime minister Bello Bouba took *de facto* control over what was the ministry of the economy. Appointed to the ministry of finance was 41-year-old **Etienne Ntsama**, from the centre-south, and a protégé of former minister of economy and planning **Onana Awana**. Ntsama, formerly director of the BIAO - *Cameroun Bank*, bolsters the role of managers from the banking sector in the cabinet and top administration, as does the appointment of 39-year-old **Jean Nkeute**, ex-deputy director of *Parisbas-Cameroun*, to deputy secretary of the president's office. **Tonye Mbog**, a schoolmate of the president, was made foreign minister. A ministry of commerce was created with a young northerner, **Tori Limangana**, at its head.

**André Ngongang Ouandji** replaced Dontsop as the fifth state minister.

The June reshuffle more decisively pushed on the process of change. Biya struck his first blow against the pillars of Ahidjo's lingering influence in the cabinet. He was also able to play on inter-regional rivalries to increase his authority. For example, even in his centre-south region he cannot yet count on total backing: he is from the Bété tribe, which in turn divides into three main factions: his Boulou people totally support him; the Ewondo people were given many important posts under Ahidjo and are suspicious of Biya; the smaller Eton people generally support him.

Thus, Ayissi Mvodo, an Ewondo, was sacked as minister of territorial administration in favour of **Jean Fouman Akamé**, a Boulou and former chancellor of the *Université du Cameroun*. Mvodo was an influential power-broker within the UNC, holding the post of political secretary in the political bureau. Not only did he control local UNC sections around the country, but he also created a parallel administration for Ahidjo which could be invaluable in view of Ahidjo's apparent desire to return to office. The dismissal of Samuel Eboua was a major personal victory for Biya. They were arch rivals. When Biya was premier, Eboua, as secretary-general of the president's office, continually blocked his initiatives.

Other significant appointments included the appointment to the ministry of agriculture of **Gilbert Andzé Tchoungui**, an Ewondo. The appointment of **François Sengat Kuoh** as minister of information and culture, replacing **Guillaume Bwelé**, was an especially clever presidential ploy on two levels: Bwelé and Kuoh, both Doualas, are bitter rivals. The switchover neutralises any Douala support for Ahidjo's clan. Secondly, Kuoh, nicknamed Cameroun's "**Kissinger**" because of his diplomatic overture towards China in the early 1970s when he was foreign minister, was working behind-the-scenes to organise matters within the UNC for Ahidjo. His new government post will now fully occupy his time and energy. Kuoh, who was the artisan of the 1972 unitary constitution, is certainly the individual with the deepest inside knowledge of the workings of the party and the state administration. And the sending into the political wilderness of **Sadou Daoudou** deprives Ahidjo of eyes and ears in the presidential palace.

**Jean Zambo**, a Boulou, takes over the secretary-generalship at the president's office. He is a technocrat, particularly close to Biya and also will oversee security matters. Along with **William Eteki Mboumoua**, formerly OAU secretary-general, **George Ngongo**, a Bakoko from Edea, was made minister in charge of missions at the president's office. These are vital *éminences grises* roles and both men handle sensitive dossiers. Ahidjo supporters were further



reduced by the dismissal of **Moustapha Hamadou** from the ministry of town planning and housing and his replacement by **Abdoulaye Babale**, a northerner with much less clout.

With so much at stake Biya has had to pay close attention to the armed forces and the security apparatus. His advisers now believe they have the situation well in hand. **Abdoulaye Maikano** has remained as minister of the armed forces, partly because he is the northerner with perhaps the closest affinities with the south. Nor is he considered a *revanchard* for the Ahidjo cause. Gen. **Semengué**, the country's only general, is a personal friend of the president and could soon be named commander-in-chief of the armed forces, a title which Ahidjo refused to grant him. The number of southerners in the high command is being increased. The senior officers from the north are generally from Ahidjo's Fulani tribe, while the northern ranks come from the non-Muslim Toupouri and Kridi ethnic groups. Since the latter have been dominated by the Fulani since the last century, Biya can probably count on their diffidence towards Fulani officers to prevent any officer adventurism.

The commander of presidential security is still a northerner, Lt-Col. **Oumarou Djam**. However, a Boulou, Lt-Col. **Mevaa**, has been named as his assistant. The president's liaison man with the armed forces is Lt-Col. **Meka**. Heading the secret service, *Direction de Documentation* (DIRDOC) is **Jean Fochivé**, the individual responsible for much of the ruthless repression in the early 1960s. Biya does not have undivided confidence in him and has appointed his deputy cabinet director, **Philippe Mataga**, to keep a close eye on DIRDOC operations.

Observers are anxiously awaiting Ahidjo's next move and Biya's response. Ahidjo has already patched up his links with Moussa Yaya, who has rallied large numbers of Fulani notables and businessmen behind Ahidjo. Their financial clout and ties with northern Nigeria are important potential cards in the upcoming power struggle. So too is control over the party apparatus.

Biya has several options open to him. He is intent on maintaining at all costs state legality and is studying what measures he could eventually take within his constitutional role to short-circuit future Ahidjo moves. If the situation becomes explosive Biya could simply dissolve the UNC and create a new political party. He has also opened up negotiations in Paris with moderate opposition forces like **Abel Eyinga's Organisation Camerounaise pour la Liberté et la Démocratie** (OCLD) and Dr. **Henri Elouga-Beng's Mouvement Camerounais pour la Démocratie et le Progrès** (MCDP). The Marxist-oriented *Union des Populations Camerounaises* (UPC) has recently



from the French capital given its tacit support to Biya. The UPC is counting on the eventual establishment of a multi-party system. Already the level of political debate in the country is remarkably bold compared to just a year ago.

It will not be until 1985, when Biya hopes to have his power legitimised through the presidential elections, that a totally new state system could emerge. A good bet at this time is the abolition, as in President Abdou Diouf's Senegal, of the premiership in order to end any ambiguity over who is boss. In the coming two years, Biya will seek to further bolster his popularity and try to avoid a head-on showdown with Ahidjo. Few observers, however, doubt that Biya would come out clearly on top in an all out battle.

CSO: 3400/1866

## BRIEFS

**CAMEROON BANK APPOINTMENTS**--The only indigenous Cameroonian bank, the Cameroon Bank, has a new General Manager, writes David Achidi Ndifang from Douala. He is 44-year-old Jurist Frederic Ngomba Eko, a former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Labour. He took over recently from the former General Manager, Mr Solomon Meh Nji, who has been called to other duties. Mr. Ntsama then appealed to current and potential customers of the bank to continue their transactions with confidence, implying that the Cameroon Bank was facing some financial difficulties. The Cameroon Bank has a capital of 705m. FCFA. In another banking development, Mr. Enow-Tanjong was recently installed as the General Manager of the Bank of Credit and Commerce of Cameroon (BCCC), again by the Minister of Finance, Mr. Etienne Ntsama. Mr. Tanjong took over from the former General Manager, Mr. S. A. Shabbir, who has taken up an appointment with the Bank of Credit of Commerce in Uruguay. The Bank of Credit and Commerce Cameroon became operational in Yaounde and Douala in 1982, with a capital of 500 million FCFA, 65 per cent of the capital is controlled by the Bank of Credit and Commerce International Holdings (Luxemburg). Minority shares are held by the following: Cameroon government, 25 per cent; the National Investment Company, 8 per cent; and the Cameroon Development Bank, 7 per cent. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International operates in 63 countries with 48 offices in under-developed countries. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3446, 29 Aug 83 p 2021]

**MILITARY CHANGES**--It should be noted that since taking over as President late last year, President Biya has been reorganising the Cameroon armed forces and there have been some marked changes. The Cameroon armed forces now have four Generals instead of one. The following senior army officers were recently promoted to the ranks of General: General de Brigade Oumarou Djam Yaya; General de Brigade Nganso Sunji; General de Brigade James Tabi Tataw--the first Anglophone General in the armed forces; and General de Division Pierre Semengue, the most senior general in the armed forces. [Excerpt] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 22 Aug 83 p 1980]

**DOUALA AIRPORT SECURITY**--As a result of armed robbery and constant break-ins into the Douala International port, the Cameroon government (new slogan of "rigour"), has decided to adopt stringent security measures to better protect the port. The surveillance services at Douala port have now been reinforced with a 100-man-strong specially trained squad of gendarmes, who will keep vigil day and night. All persons found loitering in the port will be liable to prison

terms of 6 months with hard labour. Those found around the port with suspicious goods without receipts shall be liable to imprisonment of up to five years. Unauthorised persons found at the port at night will be shot on sight if confronted by the security men. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 22 Aug 83 p 1966]

FAKE BANK WARNING--The Federal Ministry of Finance had warned members of the public against transacting business with a bank operating under the name New National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. According to the ministry, the bank claimed that it had its headquarters in Kaduna with branches at Abakaliki in Anambra and Okuku and Uyo in Cross River. The ministry said that it had neither issued any licence to any bank with the name New National Bank of Nigeria Ltd nor received an application for a banking licence under that name. The ministry said that it had reported the illegal operation of the bank to the Inspector General of Police for investigation. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3444, 15 Aug 83 p 1911]

LNG SET-BACK --The target start-up date for Cameroon's liquefied natural gas export project has been put back three years to 1990. Senegazeam, the partnership between the Cameroonian oil corporation and Elf, Shell, Mobil and Total involved in the project, has agreed to postpone a final decision on the venture until December 1984. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3444, 15 Aug 83 p 1901]

CSO: 3400/1861

## ONLY HOPE IN SITUATION REPORTEDLY TO SECURE NEW NEGOTIATION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 22 Aug 83 p 1923

[Text]

THE LATEST EVENTS in Chad are both appalling and bemusing. President Mitterrand, in deciding to cross the Rubicon and send troops into Chad (latest figures now speak of the involvement of as many as 3,000 men, including paratroops (see our report on page 1931) has, it has been said, chosen to lose his virginity rather than his credibility. Virginity, in this context, translates as keeping faith with those in his own Socialist Party who had in the past expressed reservations at France's neo-colonial military interventions in Africa, from de Gaulle to Giscard D'Estaing. Credibility, in this context, means offering assurances to the states of French-speaking Africa with which France has military agreements, that France would still intervene should any of them feel threatened.

In taking this action, President Mitterrand has ignored the blandishments of the pro-Libyans in Paris, said to be centred on the Quai D'Orsay (quite apart from what reserves may be expressed within his own party), and has preferred to cast his lot with the "co-operation" lobby, whose most powerful voice is still, after all these years, President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast. In this he is demonstrating some kind of continuity with French policy in Africa from the days of de Gaulle.

The trouble with past French interventions in Chad is that they were scarcely successful. The first time De Gaulle intervened, to help quell the Toubou rising of 1968, the rising spread so uncontrollably elsewhere in the country, that France had to intervene much more massively (deploying the Foreign Legion almost for the first time since the Algerian war), and virtually recolonise Chad's administration at the same time, to prop up the collapsing regime of President Tombalbaye. This intervention, in April 1969 (almost the last decision de Gaulle made before his resignation) was such a burden to his successor Georges Pompidou, and proved so unpopular in France once French soldiers started being killed, that in two years he started active disengagement, withdrawing first the Legion, and then making it clear to Tombalbaye that this was no open ended commitment to save his regime.

The removal of Tombalbaye by the military in 1975 was followed by the closing of the French base in N'djamena, and although Giscard, at the height of his "gendarme of Africa" phase, deployed Jaguars to assist President Malloum's losing battle against the rebellion, the commitment was nothing like the earlier one. When all French troops were invited to leave Chad in 1980, there was a general sigh of relief, and even when Libyan troops openly intervened later that year, there was no suggestion of French military might being deployed to stop Gaddafi. Chad seemed such a hornet's nest, that it seemed to the French that they were well out of it.

So what has changed? M. Mitterrand, even if he is confident of the docility of his own party, must know the dangers inherent in the situation. Even before a single military engagement, an opinion poll in *Le Quotidien de Paris* indicates that 53 per cent were against sending paras to Chad. This percentage could increase if French soldiers start "dying for Chad".

There is an important difference from the Libyan intervention of 1980. Then they were officially invited by the GUNT the then legal government in N'djamena, to put an end to the Habre dissidence. Now such Libyan intervention as there is, which seems to be quite significant, is against a government recognised by almost all states at the OAU and the UN. This, at any rate, is the official justification for trying to save the Habre government. But the main factor in the background is that the Americans have become interested in Chad, because of the US fixation with Gaddafi, and the dominance of "cold-war" geo-political thinking in Washington, to the exclusion of real African issues. For Ronald Reagan to say baldly of Chad "it is not our primary sphere of influence. It is that of France" is to reveal a simple view of the world and, worse, to imply that it is a "secondary" US sphere of influence.

It may be too much to say that it is US pressure, and fear that the US may move into this "sphere of influence" that has forced Mitterrand to act in Chad. But there is no doubt that irritation that the Americans should feel they have a role is behind the bad blood on the matter between the US and France, especially since the US seems to feel that French hesitation helped the second loss of Faya-Largeau. But to join the escalation stakes is simply to play Gaddafi's game. Three separate illusions — French, American and Libyan — have helped make an obscure war of bandit gangs into a major world crisis.

The only hope in this absurd situation is to try and secure a new negotiation: this, after all, may be all that Gaddafi is after. Here the OAU moves in Brazzaville seem to offer the beginning of a way out. As Shehu Shagari said on the day of his re-election "other countries who are poking their nose into the affairs of Chad should realise that the Chadian problem cannot be solved by war".

## PROBLEMS FACING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, OIL INDUSTRY

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3443, 8 Aug 83; No 3444, 15 Aug 83;  
No 3445, 22 Aug 83

[Part one of three-part article by Howard Schissel]

[No 3443, 8 Aug 83 pp 1813-1815]

[Text]

THIS WEEK Congo-Brazzaville is celebrating in great pomp the 20th anniversary of the August 13-15, 1963 demonstrations which overthrew the despised regime of President Fulbert Youlou and paved the way for the establishment of Africa's first self-proclaimed "Marxist-Leninist" regime.

It is interesting to note that even in their revolutionary endeavours French-speaking Africans find it impossible not to refer to the metropole's own history. Thus the August 13-15 period is commonly referred to as "*les Trois Glorieuses*" (the Three Glorious Days), in analogy to the three days in 1830 which witnessed the overturn of the legitimist monarchy in France by Parisian crowds.

Like the 1830 revolution in France, initiative soon passed from the street to the salons of professional politicians. Massemba-Débat's rise to power triggered off two decades of often turbulent history characterised by convoluted power struggles and seemingly endless plots. Tribal equations, as much as Marxist dialectic, played the role of historical motor for the Congolese revolution.

The emergence of Sassou-Nguesso was generally viewed as a victory for the PCT's left wing. In reality, the situation was much more complex. Sassou-Nguesso rehabilitated, for example, members of the radical M-22 Movement, associated with Ange Diawara, as well as political prisoners accused of complicity in the Ngouabi murder. These rehabilitations went some way to countering the influence of the pro-

Soviet wing.

Sassou-Nguesso's rise to power coincided with a doubling of the Congo's oil production and a major jump in the price of oil. The country's 1982-86 development plan was the most ambitious in its history. It is certain that this new wealth has greatly abetted the president in first years in office. Sassou-Nguesso's watchwords were conciliation and economic development. By 1981, Sassou-Nguesso had made no secret of his open support for closer ties with western countries and gave the green light to foreign investment. The menace of nationalisation was banished. The victory of the French socialists in May 1981 greatly facilitated the rapprochement with Paris. This summer Britain even decided to reopen its Brazzaville embassy.

Sassou-Nguesso has been able to project abroad an image of stability and moderation. If infighting within PCT ranks has been curbed in recent times, a certain tension, ethnic as well as social, continues to exist. Last year, mysterious bomb attacks occurred in Brazzaville, with most observers attributing them to dissent among northern army officers. The hard-line PCT faction isn't disarmed either, and its lingering influence could seriously perturb Sassou-Nguesso's pragmatic policies.

Beyond the ritual celebration of the *Trois Glorieuses*, all eyes will be focussed on the upcoming PCT congress, scheduled for early 1984. Sassou-Nguesso will be seeking to win confirmation for his new political line. In Brazzaville, most people are aware that important political events usually precede party congresses.



[Part two of three-part article by Howard Schissel]

[No 3444, 15 Aug 83 pp 1862-1864]

[Text]

IN THE MIDST of its ambitious five-year development plan, covering the 1982-86 period, Congolese economic planners have been obliged to slam on the brakes. The development plan was elaborated on the basis of oil at \$33 a barrel and with Congolese output continuing to grow at record levels. The oil price drop over the past year has radically altered this initial outlook.

The Plan document spoke of possible financial difficulties appearing in 1985-86, earmarking CFA1,100,000m. for investment outlay in infrastructure and productive industries. But as early as 1982, it became evident that the government would not be able to stick to planning projections due to lower revenue expectations. Nonetheless, government spending remained extremely vigorous last year, and gross domestic product (GDP) rose by some 8 per cent.

Compared to most other African economies, Congo's situation appears enviable. Yet 1983 is likely to be a year of retrenchment and "austerity" could be the order of the day after that. Already, Pierre Moussa, Minister of Planning, has stated that two years of cutbacks are likely. Because of the uncertainties of the oil outlook, Congo adopted a flexible planning approach. Each year, the plan is reviewed and investment expenditure is altered according to expected petro-dollar earnings.

The central core of development spending, some CFA700,000m. on infrastructure projects, is to receive top priority. Such projects as the realigning of the Congo-Océan railroad and the construction of the north-south Ouesso-Brazzaville highway will forge forward. Productive schemes in industry and agriculture are likely to be put off for better times.

The emphasis on transport and communications comes from the realisation that without proper infrastructure the Congo's future development prospects would be seriously limited. For example, the vast agricultural potential in the northern part of the country cannot be developed unless access to the market for produce in Brazzaville is assured. Also, the forestry potential in the north cannot be tapped without access to the sea. The Congo-Océan railroad, suffering from obsolescence, is high-

ly inefficient and during the rainy season derailments often paralyse trade between the port of Pointe Noire and the capital. The modernisation programme now underway has been designed to remedy this problem. The much-needed Pointe Noire highway to Brazzaville probably won't be on the agenda until the early 1990s.

Critics of the infrastructure approach say that the north-south highway has more of a political than economic *raison-d'être*. They point out that the pay-off period, when combined with the high cost of financing, building and specially maintaining the highway, will make the scheme a long-term drain on the economy. The sparsely populated northern region, it is stressed, will not be able to generate sufficient farm produce to justify the investment outlay.

Aside from these long-term issues facing Congolese development, a pressing problem which President Sassou-Nguesso's government will soon have to face is the differing pace at which improvements in the infrastructure are coming on stream, and the relative stagnation of the productive sector of the economy. The financial costs of the 1982-86 plan are liable to start eating up a larger and larger share of Congolese earnings.

The buoyant economic atmosphere of the 1979-82 period has temporarily hidden many of the intrinsic weaknesses of the Congolese economy and its growing dependency on oil. Like other oil producing states engaged in a head-on rush towards economic development, Congo will soon have to face up to a series of harsh economic realities. Congo's foreign debt was estimated in 1982 at CFA265,000m. However, most of it is in a short-term configuration of from three to five years, and repayment might become a burden difficult to carry. The debt repayment ratio in relationship to exports in 1981 stood at 28 per cent. With a fall off in oil revenues and mounting overseas borrowing, this ratio could well be in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent today. In any case, reliable statistics are impossible to come by.

A major problem sapping the economy's vitality is the inefficient para-statal sector. Considered as a "conquest" of the Congolese revolution, para-statals are overstaffed, corrupt and incapable of providing the services they were established to furnish.

This "sacred cow" is difficult to touch for the government: in a country marked by severe unemployment and under-employment, the public sector is an essential purveyor of jobs and other spoils.

Another factor inhibiting a stronger dose of economic realism are the high expectations of the Congolese population. The Congo's economy was largely dormant until 1979, and since this date the government has been stressing that a bright tomorrow awaits the Congolese. Several lists of five-year plan projects issued for public consumption noted expenditures on factories, mines, roads and dams without mentioning that these expenditures were only for feasibility studies. President Sassou-Nguesso has belatedly attempted to dampen public optimism on the flowering of a "Congolese miracle".

The sudden inflow of oil wealth since 1979 has spawned a degree of speculation and other speculative practices which were largely unknown in the past. Although the situation is a far cry from the kleptocracy which prevails across the river in Kinshasa, it has reportedly attained unprecedented proportions.

Real estate speculation, for example, has become a popular and highly lucrative pastime, particularly amongst senior Congolese officials. The influx of large numbers of expatriate personnel has created a quality housing shortage both in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire and rents have shot up to astronomical levels. Now that the oil industry has slowed down, part of this artificial bubble has started to burst.

Yet another negative feature of the oil boom has been the accelerated rate of migration from the rural zones to the cities and towns. Some recent estimates indicate that as much as 80 per cent of the Congolese population could be urbanised by the end of the century. This would create intractable problems for the government, for it is highly unlikely to be able to provide the social services and basic infrastructure necessary to offer a decent standard of living for the vast majority of the population.

The drift away from the countryside also means that the rural economy will be less and less able to provide even minimum sustenance for the urban market. Today, less than one per cent of the country's total land mass is under cultivation, and most of it on a subsistence level. The production of such export crops as cocoa and coffee plunged during the 1970s from 10,000

tonnes each year to around just 2,000 tonnes. The Nyaki sugar complex, which under private French management was producing 100,000 tonnes a year by the late 1960s, saw its output plunge after nationalisation in 1970 to 5,700 tonnes in 1978. After its reorganisation and the calling back of French technical assistance, output rose to 28,500 tonnes last year.

Cheap imports of frozen beef are a handicap for local animal husbandry. The government is obliged to earmark high subsidies for the purchase of maize to fatten cattle in order to support its faltering ranching operations. Sometimes maize is in short supply because the state marketing firm does not have sufficient funds to pay farmers for their produce. The government also has to subsidise other staple crops, like cassava.

In the long run, the poor showing of the agricultural sector is likely to cost the Congo dearly. Food imports will absorb an ever-rising proportion of the country's oil revenues. Moreover, the relatively small proportion of some 1.6m. inhabitants is increasing at the high rate of about 3 per cent a year. This percentage means that the number of hungry mouths to feed will double over the next 20-odd years.

The promising forestry industry remains underdeveloped. Congo's commercially exploitable forests cover around 13m. hectares, made up of 300 different types of wood, of which only a fifth is presently harvested. Current output is in the neighbourhood of 800,000 cubic metres a year, although the sustainable annual yield is more than double this figure. The forestry industry is largely in foreign hands and little local transformation takes place. The government has a plan to build a pulp paper mill at Pointe Noire using a revolutionary eucalyptus tree which is supposed to cut costs. With the present doldrums in the pulp paper industry and the difficulties of turning a profit in other African countries like Cameroon where such plants are in production, the Congolese venture may simply not be a sound business prospect for the near future.

Almost 60 per cent of the fish consumed in the Congo is imported, with fish imports costing CFA5,000m. a year. The Congolese trawling fleet is inhibited by the relatively narrow coastline of only some 170 kilometres and the closing of Gabonese waters. Soviet boats, moreover, prevent Congolese trawlers from operating in Angola's territorial waters.

It is clear that the euphoria of the last few years is coming to an end for the Congo. The next few years will be marked by a necessary return to realism for the Congolese economy. This will undoubtedly engender certain strains for the government. Its ability to come to grips with these problems will largely determine whether the Congo will be able to move into the second half of the decade with a relatively sound economic situation or if the facilities of a petroleum-fuelled economy will produce the mirage which has led more than one African state into a deep trough.

[Part three of three-part article by Howard Schissel]

[No 3445, 22 Aug 83 pp 1936-1938]

[Text] In the last article in our special series on the Congo, Howard Schissel, recently in Pointe Noire, the coastal oil capital, charts the hydrocarbon industry, and explains the background to Congo's recent legal battles with France's state-controlled E.I. Aquitaine.

CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE, like other oil-producing countries in Africa and the Third World, has seen its hydrocarbon hopes contract as the result of the world petroleum crisis.

A relative newcomer to the African oil scene, Congo's oil production has continued to rise in spite of the oil glut of the past 18 months. Production has climbed from around 50,000 barrels a day (b/d) in 1978 to some 90,000 b/d in 1982 and over 100,000 b/d during the first half of this year. Congo's petroleum flow, most of it from offshore fields, should continue to rise until 1985-86 when a plateau of about 140,000 b/d should be attained. The effects of the oil crisis are likely to be fully felt at this time as exploration activity has dramatically fallen off since the beginning of 1983 and development prospects for smaller, hard to exploit deposits now look dim.

Signs of the oil slowdown are already evident in Pointe Noire, the coastal port which is the centre of the petroleum industry. Since the surge of oilmen and oil service industries in the 1979-82 period, when talk of the Congo producing up to 200,000 b/d by 1986 was common, there has been a major reflux. The price of housing in Pointe Noire, which shot up in response to strong demand, has again

descended to more reasonable levels.

Two companies, France's state-controlled Elf Aquitaine group and Agip of Italy, control the whole of Congo's oil production. As in neighbouring Gabon, Elf has the dominant position, with around 70 per cent of total output. Congolese officials have sought to introduce new players into the national oil industry. Two American groups, Coastal and Cities Service, picked up exploration acreage a few years ago, but they are still only in the initial stage of their prospection efforts.

The clout of foreign oil companies operating in the country, specially for Elf, has bedevilled Congolese leaders in their attempts to extend control over this pivotal sector of the national economy. Elf started production in the 1960s, and during the early 1970s made several interesting discoveries, notably Loango in 1971 and Likoula in 1972. Elf officials spoke of producing up to 160,000 b/d by 1978, a figure now not likely to be attained before 1986. Following the oil price boom of 1973-74, Congo sought to boost its share of the hydrocarbon wealth extracted from its sub-soil through an increase in its tax and fiscal offtake from oil company earnings.

This position led then-President Marien Ngouabi's government into a head-on clash with Elf in the mid-1970s. Elf Chief Executive Pierre Guillaumat simply refused to pay taxes to Congo in 1975 and abruptly brought new investment to a halt. The result was a brutal drop in the Congo's oil output. This came at a time when the Congolese state was hard-pressed for revenues because of its ambitious development plans. Elf remained intractable saying to the Congolese that "between the

risk of bankruptcy and the risk of nationalisation, we have chosen. Now it is up to you to choose".

The situation of President Nguabi's regime became precarious as talks with Elf were deadlocked. The Congolese head of state, recognising the strength of Elf's position and the need to boost revenue, decided to seek out a *modus vivendi* with Elf at the price of numerous concessions. Thanks to the intervention of President Omar Bongo of Gabon, negotiations were re-opened. Elf's new director, Albin Chalandon, also showed a conciliatory attitude. While Minister of Mines and Petroleum Rodolphe Adada was discussing with Elf officials in Paris in March, 1977, it was announced that President Nguabi had been assassinated.

The fiscal yardstick on which the Congo's revenues were determined was based on the price of \$33 a barrel, while the selling price of Congolese oil dipped as low as \$25-\$26 a barrel earlier this year. Elf warned that it could not continue to finance the deficit on its Congolese operations, while Minister Adada warned that "if Elf is in it only for the money then all could be lost".

Elf was pushing for a formula, flexible in application, which would keep it in line with the variation in the price of crude and thus minimise its risks; the Congolese, for their part, were intent on limiting the erosion of their fiscal receipts from oil, which represent over 50 per cent of the state budget and some 75 per cent of hard cash earnings.

The solution worked out in June reduced the fiscal price (on which tax revenue is based) as at January 1 of this year, to \$29 a barrel. An adjustment clause will automatically come into operation if the sales price of Congolese oil surpasses \$29 a barrel (it had risen to \$28.50 by early July), and a meeting will take place between the government and companies if there is a major swing in oil prices.

Oil production currently comes from seven fields, of which four are offshore: Emeraude, Loango, Likoula, Yanga, Sendji, Mengo and Pointe Indienne. Several satellite fields such as Likoula III, South Loango, South Paloukou and Libondo are scheduled to be brought on stream in the next three years by Elf and Agip. The uncertainties in the world oil scene makes the eventual development of smaller fields such as Zatchi highly problematical.

Given that Congo's oil is sold abroad in US dollars and the American currency has appreciated by over 50 per cent against the

CFA franc over the past three years, the bringing into production of even marginal fields is profitable in CFA terms for the Congo. However, for a company like Elf, the equation is quite different. The French group is redeploying its research efforts towards the United States, where, in 1981, it purchased for \$2,400m. the natural resource firm, Texasgulf. In Angola, its offshore Block 3 has turned out to be an exciting prospect. Thus the Congo is receiving much less priority in Elf's world-wide strategy than just a few years back when Chalandon was advancing production possibilities in the order of 200,000 b/d a year by 1990.

Compared to the output from Angola's Cabinda enclave to the south and Gabon to the North, Congo's oil is of mediocre quality, averaging around 29 per cent gravity API (American Petroleum Institute measure for viscosity — 29 per cent is "heavy crude", making it relatively unsuitable for petroleum production). This further reduces the enthusiasm of oil companies to engage new investments. For example, the offshore Emeraude field has reserves estimated in the neighbourhood of 600m. tonnes, making it a large deposit even by world standards. The oil in place, unfortunately, is highly viscous and hard to extract. Only some 16m. tonnes have been produced from Emeraude, around 3 per cent of total reserves, because the oil flows with great difficulty. In order to increase the recovery factor to a respectable 25 to 30 per cent, Elf technicians have devised an innovative steam-injection programme, to be attempted for the first time on the high sea.

During a first experimental stage, Elf will put its new technology to the test. If the results turn out to be positive, then the eventual industrial application of the process could be envisaged. The investment outlay required has been estimated at well over \$1,000m. To make such a venture economically viable, the price of oil would probably have to be superior to \$40 a barrel, a level not liable to be attained in the coming decade or two unless there is a third "oil price shock." Emeraude will remain part of Congo's potential reserves and if one day brought on stream it could prolong for several decades the country's productive capacity.

Coastal, which heads a US consortium on the onshore Kaves block, has drilled two wildcats. The Tietie-1X will reportedly hit oil, but it is not yet known if the find is commercially viable. Having fulfilled its contractual obligations on the concession, Coastal has moved operations into low



gear, while it assesses the future of world oil prospects and the results from its drilling in the Congo.

Cities Service heads another US consortium on the offshore Marine I permit. An extremely deep well costing \$23m. was drilled last year but the deposit pinpointed was not judged as economically viable. The recent purchase of Cities Service by Occidental Petroleum raised question marks as to the future of the company's exploration programme in the Congo. This correspondent has learned that after high-level deliberations, Cities Service has decided to drill a second wildcat before the end of 1983.

Both Elf and Agip have relinquished offshore acreage under contractual agreements. Congolese officials hope to put up for adjudication by the end of the year new offshore blocks, but with the general retrenchment of the oil industry, it is not certain that there will be takers. By the same token, Congo is seeking to lure oil groups into exploration ventures in the hinterland in the Cuvette region. A geophysical survey was carried out in 1980 by the French firm, Compagnie Générale de Géophysique (CGG), and the zone has been partitioned into seven blocks averaging between 15,000 and 20,000 square kilometres each. Exxon has drilled two

unsuccessful wildcats into the same geological structure on the Zaire side of the frontier. So far, no oil company has indicated a desire to undertake such a risky venture in the Congo.

Congo finally brought into production at the end of last year its 20,000 b/d refinery at Pointe Noire. Originally built to enter into service in 1975, the \$90m. refinery was plagued by problems. Congolese authorities accused the consortium, composed of Belgium's Sybetra, Vuest Alpine of Austria and Spain's Sercobe, of serious technical negligence. An arbitration committee of the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce rendered a decision in favour of the Congolese claim and condemning the three firms to pay the entire cost of refurbishing the refinery unit.

Technip of France undertook the \$113m. rehabilitation work and the refinery was finally inaugurated in November 1982. The Pointe Noire refinery is working below capacity, as are most around the world, and its profitability is highly questionable. The Congolese refinery lacks sophisticated units and therefore produces a high percentage of fuel oil. This product is hard to place on the world market at present, and it would not be surprising if the Congolese are selling their output at a loss.

CSO: 3400/1848

SENEGAMBIA SUN'S FIRST ISSUE PUBLISHED

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 1 Aug 83 p 4

[Excerpt] The dream became a reality yesterday with the appearance of the first issue of the SENEGAMBIA SUN. The tabloid daily created by the Senegalese Press and Publication Company (SSPP) contains news items about Gambia and Senegal, as well as world news. It is being put out by a team of professionals with long experience in journalism.

The 12-page publication currently sells for one dalasi and appears weekly, but eventually it is to appear twice-weekly.

President Dawda Kairaba Jawara extended his congratulations and best wishes for success to the SENEGAMBIA SUN on its debut.

First of all he noted that the paper was being launched on a date (31 July) of historic significance for Gambia (the date of an abortive coup). "The media are of particular importance in the realization of the idea of Senegambia," said President Jawara. In his view the paper is appearing just in the nick of time, when by providing accurate and timely information it can give expression to the hopes and aspirations of the Senegambian people. In addition to news and information, the new publication also carries a variety of amusement-oriented features.

9516

CSO: 3419/1155



TRANS-NAMIBIA AIRLINE TO SHUT DOWN

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 27 Aug 83 pp 1, 11

[Text] Windhoek: The doyen of commercial flying in South West Africa, Mr Louis Rautenbach, 59, announced on Wednesday that he had decided to wind up his business, Trans-Namibia Air, on September 21.

On that date his flying licence is due for a renewal for which he will no longer apply.

Mr Rautenbach, a pilot for 33 years, of which 26 were in South West Africa, said a combination of factors had forced him out of business.

"It is true that there is a great measure of emotion involved as far as your flying licence as a commercial pilot is concerned, for that is your certificate to the breadbox. But like a boxer, who still ranks as a champ, get out while you're still on top" Mr Rautenbach said.

Mr Rautenbach said the combination of factors which led to his decision to wind up Trans Namibia were briefly the following events:

★ Next Monday, August 29, the licence issued by National Transport Commission to Caprivi Air lapses. The operations of Trans-Namibia were coupled

to a large extent with Caprivi Air and although there was never an agreement, it was a tacit understanding between Caprivi Air and Trans-Namibia to operate in conjunction with one another.

★ A Master Plan had been issued by the Army to all aviation people in the country concerning Eros Suburban in terms of which all hangars privately owned, and presently situated to the north of Eros Suburban, must be moved to the south - and the proprietors of these hangars wanted R105 000 for the twenty hangars in existence there, together with the offices presently used by Trans-Namibia. Apart from the financial factor involved here, for times were tough, Mr Rautenbach said, it would cost much more in the end to move the complex down south.

★ Aviation business had all but collapsed and this was the third and final reason why he was shutting down shop.

Mr Rautenbach spoke without emotion but there was a trace of bitterness in his voice when he remarked: "It is costly to die of a disease; it is very cheap to die of hunger".

He said that he could not say what he intended to do for a living. Mr Rautenbach did not comment on it nor was he asked to do so, but it is known that in aviation circles, that his present pension from Namib Air where he was employed as chief pilot, before starting Trans-Namibia in November 1980, is a meagre R223 a month.

Mr Rautenbach said that for the small entrepreneur in SWA there was no longer any hope. They had disappeared, Mr Rautenbach said, in virtually all walks and spheres of business activity, down from the baker and butcher to the carpenter and cobbler.

The same disease had now struck at aviation where vicious dogs were guarding a

small piece of meat, and where the monopolies were embodied in those dogs with a maze of regulations which had rendered the small operator, helpless, and had driven him out of business.

*"Faced with these things, I have no choice but to get out of the ropes as quickly as possible. Something may yet turn up for me enabling me to make a small living. But it is no longer going to be flying".*

Mr Rautenbach also said that there was the issue of his only assistant that he had in life since the launching of Trans-Namibia, being Miss Erika Zielske. When she left him a few months ago to become a partner in a liquor shop venture, he suffered a very severe blow, and it was no longer possible, despite efforts, to find a replacement for her.

Asked about the fleet of aircraft that he had operated under the name and style of Trans-Namibia, Mr Rautenbach said that these consisted of one pressurised Aerostar twin engine, the property of Mr Timo Voges, two twin-engine Comanches which were on lease to Mr Rautenbach from an SA organisation, one Cessna 310 twin, the property of Mr Herman van Wyk of Windhoek and finally he had available for short hops and the individual passenger, a Centurion which was the property of Mr Gollwitzer, the civil engineer of Rundu.

Mr Rautenbach commented that the plan by the Armed Forces as given to aviation, of moving all the T-shaped hangars to the south of Eros Suburban, constituted a considerable problem, the extent of which was not fully appreciated.

These hangars, (the property of Mr Eric Lang's sister-in-law, a Mrs Mueller) were constructed of steel beams and zinc sheets. To dismantle these, would require new floors down south at Eros Suburban, and the reassembling would push the price far beyond the demanded R5 100 per hangar. The fact that Mrs Mueller had given him notice like all other tenants of those hangars, in June of this year, thus played

a strong role in making up his mind to wind up affairs. He could still find alternative office accommodation for Trans-Namibia for the present offices were also Mrs Mueller's property, but the hangars posed a far greater problem.

Mr Rautenbach said that he had understood from the other tenants that they shared his opinion not to buy from Mrs Mueller. The price of R5 100 per hangar for each of the twenty units sounded reasonable, but would no longer be the case the moment they were moved, for that would incur tremendous additional costs.

The time had now come to stop operations entirely for there was on the advent, the contingency of financial

losses and before entering such a phase it was best to desist entirely.

At the same time, it had become to him a make or break issue and thus when on September 21, Trans-Namibia was wound up, he would allow his commercial flying licence to lapse at the same time for there would be no application from him to the Department of Civil Aviation for a renewal.

Mr Rautenbach said that for quite some time after September 21, his only involvement in aviation would be, as he put it, to collect the few pennies still owing to Trans-Namibia. Thereafter it was a matter of leaving it to chance and to good fate.

S. AFRICA ACCUSED OF SHABBY TREATMENT OF NAMIBIAN PRESS

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 27 Aug 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Political Inferiority Gets Another Chance To Insult People"]

[Text] Members of the South West Africa press should have expected the treatment meted out to them at Strijdom Airport on Wednesday afternoon with the brief stopover on his way to the north of Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General. After all, the indignities they had to suffer were but indicative of what South Africa thinks of South West Africa--nothing, other than a tract of land urgently fulfilling strategic needs, a situation more or less like that of the powerful and wealthy tycoon visiting the young woman who he regards as a slut, but who satisfies his appetites and who is visited, but surreptitiously.

What bothers this newspaper though, is not the treatment meted out to its staff member, Gwen Lister, for after all she is placed on the same level by South Africa and her henchmen in South West Africa as this newspaper's Smith. We are regarded as the scum and the communists, the Red Peril, the underminers; the bearers of the Swapo pennant receiving their money from the coffers of the Soviet Union.

It is a tragedy that these beliefs based on political idiocy and prejudice could not have been the truth, for then we would have been somewhere.

What we wish to state for the record today, is that we fail to understand why journalists not associated with this newspaper were treated in the same way.

Who wants to deny the fact that each and every one of the Windhoek newspapers, with the exception of this one, is a champion of the South African cause.

He who denies that is a cold-blooded liar, for all of them, except this one, had stepped forward throughout the years, to uphold the South African image, and to carry over the "soundness" of South African policies practiced here in all its ugliness.

It is of little concern that we are scum in South African eyes, down from our Judge President to our Prime Minister; what interests us is the blindness of the people in this country not to detect what South Africa thinks of them, but yet to cling to the hemline of her skirts.

By treating a staff member of DIE REPUBLIKEIN or for that matter of the Windhoek Advertiser, on the same level as that of the Windhoek Observer, goes to show South Africa's total indifference to the feelings of the people of this country.

After all, it is not the cronies of the press world in South Africa that have to cater for the readings needs of South West Africa; the Windhoek press is fully equipped, and we are in fact too many newspapers, and all shades of opinion and sentiments are properly taken care of, but South African political stupidity of course overlooks this sort of thing, and to add to this unspeakable tragedy, most members of the local press will take the slap in the face and turn the other cheek, as they have done in the past 60 years.

Hearken our message! We are in the hands and under the control of a feelingless master and when we say 'we' we mean the people of this country, but at the same time we have to add that it appears that the bulk of them like to be in such an iron grip, without any rights whatsoever.

CSO: 3400/1862

COLUMNIST ANALYZES PARTY POSITIONS VIS A VIS UN

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 27 Aug 83 p 40

[Article in the column "Gwen Lister Looks at the Political Scene": "With a Touch of Melodrama"]

[Text]

Windhoek is usually a sleepy, laid-back sort of town - that is, until anyone from the United Nations arrives. In this event, the town erupts into a state of frenzy, with security measures, the like of which have probably never been exceeded on the continent of Africa.

And the whole visit began to take on a positively hysterical note.

In front of the Kalahari Sands Hotel, where the Secretary General was scheduled to meet with local parties, Policemen with snarling dogs, provided a deterrent for any potential demonstrator who wished either to protest or welcome the visit by the Secretary General.

At Eros Suburban, where the Mercurius carrying Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, landed, he confronted a

press corps waiting for the usual platitudes which are routinely uttered by such eminent visitors.

At Strijdom Airport where Mr de Cuellar landed on Wednesday of this week, to merely change planes and fly to the north for a "break from the press", security was also stringent. Snipers on the roof, the airport swarming with officious security policeman, searches of vehicles and of persons at the gates, and the demanding of either identification or plane tickets.

The Namibian press operates usually, on a far lower key than pressmen in other countries, but when they do have a story, or some excitement in lives which are otherwise punctuated by mundane happenings, they are robbed.

This may sound a trifle dramatic - but it is certainly true.

While Department of Information lackeys are allowed access to the tarmac, and while the plane carrying Mr de Cuellar is filled with journalists both from South Africa and abroad, Windhoek journalists were fighting inside the air terminal to get permission to stick a camera lens through an open door. This was not allowed in any event, and during an altercation, a journalist was threatened with physical eviction.

And so the local press had to make do with blurred pictures, taken through windows, while the press from the rest of the world and South Africa had close-ups of Mr de Cuellar, and the opportunity to ask him what he preferred for breakfast.



Confusion and dis-organisation prevailed in Windhoek regarding his visit and no help was forthcoming from official sources, who either weren't telling, but were in all likelihood more in the dark than the local press.

### **ONE OF THOSE IRONIES**

And of course, a visit of this nature is accompanied by ironies sometimes difficult to believe. Several people had a quiet snigger at the refusal by a party such as Swanu, to meet with Mr de Cuellar, because "the invitation was extended by the office of the Administrator General".

The matter is not one of principle, so why should the Swanu movement for instance, refuse? They are quite happy, in the normal course of events, to chat cosily with the Administrator General about an "interim arrangement" for the country, and after having left his presence, talk about the "liberation struggle".

And in addition, they are always joining the chorus of protestations about the impartiality of the United Nations.

But they refuse to see Mr de Cuellar because the invitation came through the office of the Administrator General.

For the same reasons, of course, Swapo would not meet with Mr de Cuellar, unless the invitation was issued through either the UN or one of the Western embassies. But theirs is a matter of principle not to acknowledge the authority or the presence of Dr van Niekerk.

For Swanu, however, there is no principle involved.

### **ANOTHER OBJECTION**

Yet another objection forthcoming from an internal party was the CDA of Mr Peter Kalangula, which stated that they felt the 15 minutes allotted to them, were insufficient, and therefore they would not attend.

This objection at least, has some merit. For 15 minutes is indeed a rather brief period in which to put a point of view across.

It was on the invitation of the South African Government and apparently as a "guest" of the Administrator General that Mr de Cuellar visited this country.

And the South Africans of course, must be delighted at the lacklustre response on the part of local parties (for which the security arrangements certainly compensated, I might add).

How are such visits organised by Pik and the boys in Pretoria? Do they deliberately



leave things to the last moment? Is it a deliberate move on their part to issue invitations to local parties via the office of Dr van Niekerk, fully aware of the fact that the parties will raise the strongest objections?

"You see, the Namibians aren't really interested in a 435-type settlement" they will claim, "since political parties are obviously not interested in any UN-sponsored election".

So who could possibly blame the United Nations if they don't want to visit Namibia again? Local parties have been crying out to be heard, to be taken into account, and to contribute their mite to the future of Namibia, but when the man arrives in person, they will have nothing to do with him.

#### **A SHOW OF STRENGTH**

And certainly the local security services put on a massive show

of strength for Mr de Cuellar and his entourage. Why, one wonders, was security that tight, and was all the drama strictly necessary?

We're here to stay, was the message that came across fairly strongly, to onlookers, regarding the SA presence in Namibia.

We don't want a settlement, and we don't need a settlement, was their attitude.

They invited and permitted Mr de Cuellar to visit this country, purely as a show to the international community that the "door is still open".

But it seems in reality, that it's never been more tightly closed.

For South Africa does not want a settlement, and Mr de Cuellar has wasted his time coming here. Especially if he was under the mistaken impression that his visit could speed up the implementation of Resolution 435. He was never more mistaken.

# ANNOUNCING INCORRECT ELECTION RESULTS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 22 Aug 83 p 1973

[Text]

FEDECO has admitted announcing incorrect figures in the presidential election.

The fresh figures which give more votes to President Shehu Shagari (NPN), Chief Awolowo (UPN), Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP) and Mr. Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP) slashed the scores of Mr. Tunji Braithwaite (NAP) and Mr. Hassan Yusuf (PRP).

The old and new figures are:

● OLD: SHAGARI: 282,820 (38.44 per cent). AWOLOWO: 160,720 (21.84 per cent). AZI-KIWE: 148,055 (20.13 per cent). YUSUF: 81,205 (11.04 per cent). BRAITHWAITE: 37,318 (5.07 per cent). WAZIRI: 25,530 (3.47 per cent).

● NEW: SHAGARI: 316,643

(43.74 per cent). AWOLOWO: 182,495 (25.21 per cent). AZI-KIWE: 170,535 (23.55 per cent). YUSUF: 12,698 (1.77 per cent). BRAITHWAITE: 12,985 (1.79 per cent). WAZIRI: 28,407 (3.93 per cent).

The amendment altered the scoreline thus:

SHAGARI: 12,047,648 to 12,081,471. AWOLOWO: 7,885,434 to 7,907,209. AZI-KIWE: 3,543,663 to 3,557,113. YUSUF: 1,847,481 to 1,778,974. WAZIRI: 640,928 to 652,805. BRAITHWAITE: 308,842 to 284,509.

FEDECO said it was sorry for the error, explaining it obtained the new position from a comprehensive statement of result by the deputy returning officer (unnamed) in the state.

CSO: 3400/1865

## NIGERIA

### FAILURE OF AGRICULTURE SCHEME BLAMED ON NPN

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 1 Aug 83 p 5

[Text] The failure of the Green Revolution Programme in some areas of the southern part of the country has been explained.

This is because of the confrontational attitude of non-NPN controlled governments resulting in the total neglect of agriculture in their states.

Speaking to thousands of party supporters at a rally in Katsina in Kaduna State, the national chairman of the National Party of Nigeria, (NPN), Chief Adisa Akinloye said the governors of the affected states lacked original thinking.

He said that notable among the governors who obstructed the programme were those of the UPN, PRP and the NPP and referred to a court action against the federal government.

Chief Akinloye noted that from his campaign tour experience, vast land in the north of the country remain green with various plants and described the programme as very successful in the areas.

Chief Akinloye described the next election as crucial to the nation and urged women and the youth to vote enmasse for the NPN.

At Daura, Chief Akinloye said the PRP government in Kaduna State had brought confusion and disaster to the people.

He said the time had come to rectify and change the government in the state by voting NPN into power at the next poll, adding the PRP had lost its head.

He warned the people not to listen to stories of deceit by some political opponents.

Chief Akinloye remarked that the UPN leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo would be given a crushing defeat at the poll adding that a vote for the UPN was a "vote for disaster, violence and confusion".

He said the NPN would not sign any accord with any political party after the election.

Also addressing the party supporters, the chairman of the Daily Times, Alhaji Dambatta observed that Katsina was for the NPN.

**FEDECO HEAD PROMISES INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED MALPRACTICES**

**London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 27 Aug 83 p 1973**

**[Text]**

THE Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) is to investigate the allegation of electoral malpractices in the gubernatorial election held throughout the country on August 13. Any of the results found to have been falsified would be nullified, the Chairman of the commission Mr. Justice Victor Ovie-Whiskey said.

Speaking at a press conference in Lagos, the FEDECO boss said that he was aware of serious complaints about electoral malpractices in Anambra, Oyo and Ondo. "I assure you that the wrongs would be fully rectified," he said. "In the case of Anambra and Oyo states in particular, if the complaints are justified, they would be remedied with immediate effect," he said.

He also said that as a result of the experiences of the controversial elections, he had directed that in the remaining three elections — senatorial, house of representatives and house of assemblies — copies of the result sheets at polling stations should be handed to the police and NSO. He explained that in case of disputes arising about the figures, the commission would crosscheck the result sheets with the police and the NSO.

Ondo and Anambra resident electoral commissioners have been summoned to Lagos in respect of the governorship election in the three states, the electoral commissioners have been asked to produce documents for scrutiny.

**CSO: 3400/1864**

## ETHNIC DISTRUSTS EXPLOITED IN RIVERS STATE POLITICS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3442, 1 Aug 83 p 1757

[Text]

CHIEF Melford Okilo's campaign tour of the Rivers State is in many ways the most intensive of any incumbent governor. For the last four weeks or so he has remained fully on the road, leading a huge bandwagon of supporters and government advisers along with the NPN candidates for the respective legislative seats on a virtually non-stop campaign in which the major elements have turned out to be his struggle to beat down an extremely strong challenge mounted separately by the NPP and the UPN. The NPP has once again concentrated on the mainland areas of the state as it did in 1979, but instead of putting forward an Ikwerre candidate it has fielded an Ogoni, Chief Kemte Giadom in an attempt to get away from the stigma of being an Igbo-dominated party. The Ikwerres who reside in the Port Harcourt mainland area are linguistic relatives of the Igbos.

The UPN has concentrated on disgruntled elements in the governor's own stronghold areas such as Bonny, Sagbama and other riverine areas. In confronting the stronger challenges that these two parties have mounted in 1983, Governor Okilo has tended to fall back on appeals to regional or state chauvinism to defeat the challengers. In 1979 the UPN made a very feeble showing in the state when Chief Wenike Briggs, who was Commissioner of Trade and Industry in Gowon's government, was fielded as governor. Chief Briggs was very unpopular in his own home base of Abonnenmma and was unable to build up support for the party in other parts of the state. This year the party turned to an articulate former educationalist from Okilo's own home area, Chief Augustine Akene, to carry the party's flag and offer a direct

challenge to Governor Okilo in his own heartland.

Governor Okilo's task has not been facilitated by the perceived negative image of his administration in the urban centres and in some parts of the state where promised developments have been totally discarded. His state has also suffered like many others from delayed revenue allocation from the centre and this has led to widespread failure to pay government workers on time. The reverberations of this problem are no less distressing in this state than in the neighbouring Bendel State where the UPN has ruled under Governor Alli for four years. In the face of what seems like impossibly difficult political odds, Chief Okilo has mounted a comeback campaign that is remarkable for its boldness and resilience as well as for its ability to manufacture vote-catching issues which threaten to supersede direct interests of the prevailing public view in the last moments of the campaign.

Taking a look back, it is worth remembering that Governor Okilo faced an even greater battle in the primaries than did his counterpart Governor Alli in Bendel State. In the first flush of battle he was faced with challenges from about 17 of his party members. Eventually this was whittled down slightly to about 13. He was able eventually to prevail after fighting off challenges so bitter that the NPN's National Executive Council was forced to order a re-run. It would have been only natural to expect the repercussions of this traumatic political infighting to affect the governor's impact in the campaign period. For a time it seemed that some of the tactics and accusations that his own partymen raised against him were coming back to haunt him in the electioneering period but in the final



push it has become clear that he has succeeded in calling most of his internal party opponents to order.

One of the Governor's major political backers is Chief Ranami Abah the national vice-chairman (south) of the NPN. It is his contention that Nigerian political life is dominated by the perception of loyalty to personalities and their perceived response to local demands. By this criteria Chief Melford Okilo is one of the most effective politicians in the country. Government critics have long contended that the main city Port Harcourt has been developed at the expense of the riverine areas. Chief Abah describes Chief Okilo as a "credible fighter for the rights of the riverine areas" and contends that it is this aspect of his career that the average Rivers State voter eventually compares to that of his opponents, invariably to Okilo's advantage. From the evidence of his last-lap campaigns in the rural areas of the state, Chief Abah is not being politically indulgent. Chief Okilo comes to life in what he terms "the grassroots situation". He uses a conversational style and his main asset is a sharp tongue and an elephantine memory for the incidents of the region's political past. He also uses pidgin English with a bright proverbial touch that reveals a subtle and merciless sense of humour. Ever since he has unleashed these formidable campaign weapons in the frantic and overwhelming manner of an incumbent with limitless resources at his disposal his opponents have had to develop tactics of near-slander to neutralise his impact.

Chief Okilo has insisted on portraying the major opposing parties as being beholden to forces that are traditionally inimical to the basic interests of the state. In the case of the NPP he has unashamedly raised the issue of that party's largely Igbo-base in national politics and reminded Rivers State indigenes of the period when the major Igbo leaders opposed the formation of the Rivers State.

## Ethnic sniping

Chief Okilo, speaking in the Ogoni area, revealed that Chief Giadom's party leaders have made promises to their followers in other states that would mean a reduction in development efforts in his own area. At the same time he claimed that they had promised to ensure Chief Giadom greater freedom and revenue for the Rivers State under their leadership. Using a well-known

pidgin phrase Chief Okilo then asked "How can? Monkey deh wear coat?" (Meaning "Can the impossible happen?") However, it is one of the peculiarities of ethnic relationships in the state that the traditionally humble and peaceful Ogonis have often been made the butt of dissent and regional struggle for land in the state, and they are extremely sensitive to denigratory jokes. Playing on this sensitivity, Chief Giadom displayed his political willingness by spreading the news that Chief Okilo had insulted the "entire Ogoni nation". Chief Okilo's merciless response to this attempt at ethnic blackmail was to inspire his propaganda machinery to attack Chief Giadom even more viciously on his association with people who had insulted the Ogonis more viciously in the past.

On the UPN Chief Okilo has been equally direct in his attacks. He is particularly convincing in the Ijaw areas where he has been a credible and highly vocal representative of the people's interest for several years starting in the first Republic as a parliamentarian under the aegis of the defunct Niger Delta Congress. A large part of these areas, the Western Ijaw area, which is now in the Rivers State was once under the Western Region government of Chief Awolowo, and later was a part of the Midwestern Region (now Bendel State) before being shifted into the Rivers State by Irikefe Boundary Adjustments Committee. Chief Okilo constantly reminds his Ijaw audiences that Chief Awolowo's government claimed that conventional development projects in those areas were too costly and sought to pursue a policy of "upland development" similar to that which he feels has led to economic imbalance between riverine and upland areas in the state today.

The Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) was mentioned at one point in the last moments of the campaign by Chief P. G. Warmate the PRP governorship candidate from Bonny LGA who stated that eventually the five parties opposing the NPN would rally around a single candidate. Within a week of this utterance extraordinary confusion entered the ranks of this tentative alliance in the state. Chief Warmate was picked up by the police for allegedly causing a public disturbance in Buguma. Chief Akene and Chief Giadom were attacking each other's programmes publicly and declaring that neither one would step down for the other. In the meantime Chief Okilo was intensifying his campaign in the upland areas especially in

Ahoada, Ikwerre-Etche, and Port Harcourt local government areas, which border on the NPP Imo State and which are still considered NPP fiefs. At the same time the most popular NPP politician in the state, Senator Obi Wali, was facing a serious criminal charge in court stemming from an old fraud investigation, and this was not doing the party's image any good. The fact that Chief Okilo deliberately avoided mentioning this to respect the judicial privilege of the courts did not mean that he was not taking note of it. When he made a bombshell announcement, that if he was returned he would support the division of the state into the three new states, he was deliberately drawing attention to the fact that Obi Wali had been the major champion of the creation of a Port Harcourt State which would have effectively split the most developed areas off from the under-developed riverine areas. He stated with convoluted logic that since the Rivers State provided about 60 per cent of the federal revenue it deserved to have more than two states created out of it, if states must be created. At the same time his criteria for state creation, he said, is that equal portions of upland and riverine areas should be included in each state. This is of course a political joker, geographically, because attempts to delineate borders that would satisfy these criteria could take forever.

Governor Okilo's chances of re-election are stronger today than they were before his campaign blitz (officially designated "the Okilo '83 love boat") took off. The fact that there was no *en-masse* carpet crossing after the vicious primary battles and the merciless Okilo put-down of his challengers points to the fact that the major political forces in the party felt convinced that they could not lead their followers into supporting the opposing groups precisely because of the fears of outside domination which Chief Okilo has used so brilliantly in his final push. It was rumoured for some time that many of them were working underground from within the party to ensure President Shagari's victory as President and Governor Okilo's defeat in Rivers State. The Governor's team has, however, successfully exposed the folly of any such plan which they portray as a strong link to the centre to be able to fend off the attempts of more powerful neighbours to deny them their share of development projects and economic privilege.

## Apathy and violence

In the final analysis, though, voting in this state depends largely on one factor that many of Chief Okilo's opponents have overlooked, the actual turnout of the voters on polling day. The voters list (which this correspondent has actually seen parts of) is vast. But whether up to a third of those listed will actually vote is a moot point. In some areas of this state, voter apathy was so profound in 1979 that a Senator was returned with an overall plurality of less than 4,000 votes. If this occurs again this year then those parties which have managed to organise identified voters and keep them in line may very well be the winning ones. In some areas like Okrika and Bonny, the UPN has taken this into consideration and is concentrating on quiet house-to-house campaigning. In the Ijaw areas the NPN is working along the same lines, but it is faced with equally determined canvassers and campaign strategists who have filtered in from Bendel State under the UPN aegis. The flashpoint of violence is very low in such a situation and this is one reason why predictions on the outcome of the Rivers State electoral race have to be made very cautiously.

Governor Okilo's performance record remains under scrutiny and in the high density urban areas this is not a dead issue at all especially among market women and government workers hit by high commodity prices, and shortfalls in salary payments. According to his supporters these criticisms are misguided since Governor Okilo has himself claimed that fraudulent practices by public officers have often been the cause of these economic ills. But that is not enough. People are angry and aggrieved. In answer, the party members claim that Rivers State has been the victim of high expectations and low revenue returns. They claim that those major projects which have been abandoned will be reassessed and completed and that some will be shelved to ensure that the ones already on the ground are achieved. They also claim that there will be far-reaching personnel changes in the Cabinet to reflect an increased commitment to broader participation of the state executive of the party in policy-making. One of the main causes of the bitter primary battles had been the allegation that Chief Okilo had packed the

state executive of the party as well as government with hand-picked supporters of his own ideas. It is difficult to say now whether the electorate in the important urban centres have really bought these promises of change. One thing that seems certain is that Chief Okilo has succeeded in reviving his charismatic influence in the riverine areas and that he has called the party leaders to order to ensure unity of action at election time. This may very well be a winning formula for him, but the challenges especially from Chief Akene of the UPN remain dangerous and formidable.

CSO: 3400/1864

# CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF ELECTIONS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3443, 8 Aug 83 p 1799

[Text]

BY THE TIME most people read this, the results of the presidential election in Nigeria will be known. It is therefore an opportunity to reflect further on the nature of the election, and look behind the event and what has led to it, to see if we can learn anything more about Nigeria's experience of politics as an independent country over these last 23 years.

It is commonplace to refer to what the late Billy Dudley, in his last book (reviewed in these pages last week), describes as the consensual basis of the Second Republic — that the political class (Dudley describes the constitution as "drawn up" by the elite for the elite"), all the parties, however much they abuse each other, have a vested interest in the continuation of the system, because it is a system designed for enough of them to draw some of the benefits. This consensus was somehow symbolized by the way two of the principal contestants, Awolowo and Shagari, met and embraced at Kano airport before travelling to Lagos a week before the election. This repeated the various contacts between party leaders intent on maintaining the civilities and not straining the system too much. An election campaign is a heady affair, and this one has been thick with vituperation, and has had its share of violence, thus the elections themselves, from the presidential right through to the state assemblies, are a major test of how this presidential system, this brand of democracy, works when the stresses are really placed on it. The last election was conducted by the military: This time it is the civilians themselves who have the responsibility for the survival of their own regime.

When issuing instructions to the Constitutional Drafting Committee in October 1975, the late Murtala Mohammed said that part of the trauma that the country had been through — which was to be prevented — was the tendency to regard the winning of elections as "a life and death struggle which justifies all means fair and foul". He also cited the fact that the "interests of party leaders came to supplant the interests of the public and indeed of their

parties, because once in power there was hardly any question of public or party accountability" and the fact that "orderly succession to power was virtually impossible".

His programme was thus to eliminate cut-throat politics based on winner-take-all, discourage institutionalised opposition to the party in power, develop consensus politics, establish the principle of accountability, eliminate over-centralisation of power in a few hands, discourage the proliferation of political parties and foster the development of genuinely national parties. The stress was undoubtedly on nation-building, and the constitution makers took his injunctions seriously — sometimes too seriously. As Dudley says, there was a danger that in trying to solve the ills of the first Republic in a constitution, they were in danger of creating a legal Pandora's Box which "if opened could easily overwhelm the ends they sought to achieve".

But it is hard to escape the feeling that all along, the structure of the Second Republic, with its stress on measures to consolidate national unity, has taken a toll in other directions. The formulation of policy has often seemed woolly and inarticulate, and although the executive has shown decisiveness in emergencies (as with the April 1982 austerity measures), it has rarely come through. The price of consensus, with its stress on the distribution of spoils, seen classically in the unrealistic plans for a multitude of further states, is one that, now that the treasury is empty, Nigeria is going to find it difficult to pay. Dudley says pointedly that "nowhere is the elite consensus underlying the Second Republic better demonstrated than in the use of the expression 'the federal character of the federation' in references to the exercise of presidential power with respect to appointments to different positions". In short, the price of national unity is the national gravy train.

The one injunction of Murtala's that has scarcely been observed is that concerning public accountability. Where, for example, is the code of conduct? This is why these elections, the only form of accountability apparently available, take on a further dimension. The voters do have a choice, and it is vital that the choice be conducted in as favourable conditions as possible. Supporters of the present government say that the consolidation of national unity needs continuity. Others will say that the system would benefit triumphantly were there a change, both at state level and national. And if the system is imperfect, and has been showing it, one of the challenges of the next four years is how to improve its imperfections. There is consensus much wider than the elite that this system is still better than the military alternative.



ANALYSIS OF SHAGARI'S VICTORY PROVIDED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 17, 17 Aug 83 pp 1-5

[Article: "Nigeria: Winner Takes All"]

[Text]

Shehu Shagari's landslide victory in the presidential elections exceeded the expectations of all but his most wildly optimistic campaign strategists; and his *National Party of Nigeria's* (NPN) victory in 12 of the gubernatorial elections (with still two results to be declared) is almost literally incredible. The opposition, dismembered to the core, can be expected to fight a violent rearguard action against the results in some states. A curfew has been imposed in Anambra and Plateau states, and in Oyo there is to be another vote in the municipal area of Ibadan after the initial gubernatorial result suggested that the *Unity Party of Nigeria* (UPN) had won only 39% compared to the UPN's 58%. The overall security situation has remained manageable so far but can be expected to become more difficult during the next few days.

At this stage there are four general points to note:-

- By winning close to an absolute majority of the presidential vote, and 25% of it in 16 of the 19 states, Shagari and the NPN have clearly benefitted from a bandwagon effect in the gubernatorial elections.
- Electoral fraud has clearly been excessive in some states, but it does not account for Shagari's victory.
- The *Nigeria Peoples' Party* (NPP) and the UPN did not have time between the announcement of the presidential result and the beginning of the gubernatorial election to devise a joint strategy. There may, however, be some accord in the third and fourth rounds in the elections for the National Assembly. There is thus a fair prospect that Shagari will again fail to get a working majority in the National Assembly.
- Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NPP and Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the UPN will now go into political retirement. The former governor of Kano, Abubakar Rimi, may be a candidate for Azikiwe's succession, though the NPP's disastrous electoral performance makes the outlook most uncertain. The leading contenders for Awolowo's post are Chief Abacha and the Lagos governor Lateef Jakande.

**The presidential round**

Shagari failed to win 25% of the vote in only the Yoruba states of Ogun, Ondo and Lagos. His 25%

of the vote in Imo and one-third in Anambra must be especially gratifying to him, and to his leading Ibo supporters, vice-president Alex Ekwueme, former Biafran leader Emeka Ojukwu, and former eastern premier Michael Okpara. The figure in Anambra is especially impressive. This being the home state of Ekwueme and Ojukwu, it is likely to lead to substantial gains in subsequent elections for the NPN.

While losing some ground in the minority states, he gained in Plateau and Bendel, where he had run second in 1979, and remained throughout the clear choice of the nation's politically strategic minority groups. Finally, he solidified his base strikingly - unbelievably, claim the opposition parties - in Bauchi and Sokoto, while also scoring impressive gains in Kaduna, Kano and Borno, picking up strength from the weakened PRP and GNPP as the NPN's campaign strategy had called for. Indeed, it would seem that every major element of the NPN's campaign strategy has been richly fulfilled. Deep inroads have been made into the Ibo and Yoruba states - indicated perhaps most clearly by Shagari's 37.6% of the vote in Oyo state, the Yoruba heartland. The NPN has held on to its predominance in the minority states, with erosion in some states, such as Cross River and Niger, being offset by gains elsewhere. Shagari has picked up a significant share of those who voted for Aminu Kano and Waziri Ibrahim in 1979. And he wiped out the opposition in Bauchi and Sokoto.

By contrast, Awolowo hardly improved at all on his 1979 showing. While he scored several million more votes, his percentage of the vote increased by only one and a half percentage points. He was able to add only one state, Cross River, to the six in which he scored 25% in 1979, failing that crucial target in such key states for him as Borno and most embarrassingly, Bauchi, the home state of his running-mate. In each of these states enormous resources were invested and much prestige staked. In particular, Awolowo's extremely poor showing once again in Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto and Bauchi - the Hausa-Fulani heartland - indicates the irrelevance of his much hailed alliance with the 'Kaduna Mafia' (AC Vol. 24 No. 14) or at least that fragment of it known as the Concerned Citizens. Even with a well-known indigene as his running mate, Awolowo was barely able to achieve five per cent of the vote in Bauchi.

The biggest loser in the presidential election would seem to be the NPP, which had expected to run a strong third and finish substantially ahead of its 1979 showing. Instead, Dr. Azikiwe finished with only 14% of the vote, three percentage points short of his disappointing 1979 vote. Moreover, he was able to add only one state - Niger - to the three in which he scored 25% in 1979 (Imo, Anambra and

Plateau), and in each of those three he lost ground. This erosion was especially striking in his home state of Anambra, where the efforts of Ekwueme and Ojukwu reduced his 1979 score by 15%, plunging him to 58%. While gaining in Kaduna (where he topped 10%) and in Benue, Gongola and Kano (getting more than 20% in each), he gained much less than his party expected. So disappointing was this first election for the NPP that it could seriously demoralise NPP supporters in the subsequent rounds - as has emerged from the gubernatorial results. This probably partly explains the bitterness with which the NPP is challenging some of the results so far.

The NPN hoped and planned that a solid victory for Shagari in the first round would have a 'bandwagon' effect on the voting in future rounds. Since the overriding election issue has been the delivery of the stuff of development - schools, roads, water, electricity, industries, fertilizer, and so forth - many states, and especially the minority ones, will want now to be seen by the NPN federal government as supporters, sympathizers and friends. According to this theory, these states will now want to choose governors and senators and the like who will cooperate with the Shagari government, rather than squander the state's chances for a fair share of federal patronage in pointless confrontation. This factor probably weighed heavily in Bendel - where the UPN governor, Ambrose Alli, expectedly lost to the NPN's Samuel Ogbemudia. It also probably made the difference in Cross River and Gongola (which also had an unpopular governor seeking re-election against a strong NPN challenge, complicated by a strong UPN challenge as well).

It is remarkable that this bandwagon saved even the NPN's most unpopular governors, Aper Aku of Benue and Anwal Ibrahim of Niger. There are two important considerations here. First, Shagari is significantly more popular than his party in many parts of the country. Hence a vote for Shagari in the presidential election was not expected necessarily to translate into a vote for local NPN candidates. By the same token, Awolowo is less popular than his party outside the Yoruba states. Certainly, for example, one would have expected the incumbent governor of Borno, Mohammed Goni, to run considerably stronger on the UPN ticket than the 16.7% of the Borno vote scored by Awolowo.

The same applied to the UPN in Gongola, and even in Cross River and Kwara, where he ran very strongly but was second to Shagari. Kwara presents

In the first, presidential round, Shagari scored four million more votes than his nearest rival, Awolowo, with the following totals released by IFEDCO on August 12 after revisions of the figures for Gongola State:

Shehu Shagari, NPN	12,081,471	25% in 16 states
Obafemi Awolowo, UPN	7,907,209	8
Nnandi Azikiwe, NPP	3,557,113	4
Hassan Yusuf, PRP	968,974	1
Waziri Ibrahim, GNPP	643,805	0
Tunji Braithwaite, NAP	271,524	0

an especially interesting case because it has been apparent for some time now that the NPN's original power baron in the state, senate majority leader **Sola Saraki**, intended to work for Shagari in the presidential election but against incumbent governor **Adamu Atta** in the following round. Similarly in the northern states which the NPP hoped to capture - Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna, Kano and Gongola - Zik was well known to be trailing behind his gubernatorial candidates, who always had strong prospects in Plateau, Benue, Niger and Kano.

### **Bandwagon and boomerang?**

There has been a bandwagon effect. So may there also be a 'boomerang' effect. The two constituent elements in the *Peoples' Progressive Alliance* (PPA) have been beaten badly in the first two rounds, and they are now cooperating in many key states to try to limit the damage and even score gains. Such cooperation could prove decisive in those states where both the UPN and NPP have some considerable strength: in particular Benue, Gongola, Kaduna, and possibly also Bendel, Borno, Kwara and Rivers. What has hurt the PPA, however, is the late announcement of the presidential elections results, which only became clear (in terms of the trend) on the following Wednesday and official on Thursday, two days before the gubernatorial voting. PPA cooperation cannot thus take full effect until the third and fourth rounds of voting (for the two houses of the National Assembly). But this could be crucial in determining the national balance of power, particularly Shagari's room for manoeuvre in his second term. If they cooperate constituency by constituency the NPP and UPN could well take firm control of the National Assembly.

At present the biggest issue is the conduct of the election. It appears that the NPN has won a massive electoral victory in the first two rounds. But to what extent will the opposition parties accept these results as free and fairly arrived at, and hence legitimate? The presidential election was conducted in an atmosphere of tranquility that was, in the context of Nigerian political history, unprecedented. But proceedings in the gubernatorial round were less

smooth, and show signs of escalation because of the rout of the opposition parties. Ironically, the fate of the Second Republic is more in the balance because of the NPN's landslide. While it was to be expected that the losing parties would cry foul, it was significant that the opposition parties began doing so almost from the moment the polls closed.

By the following Monday and Tuesday, a number of serious complaints of electoral malpractices had been voiced before the outcome of the election was known. Perhaps not coincidentally, these complaints have been most heated - and most specific and pervasive - in the three states where Shagari recorded his largest votes - Sokoto, Bauchi and Kaduna. Collectively, these states provided more than a third of Shagari's 12m votes. In all three states, all five opposition parties complained that their party polling agents were forbidden access to, or were driven away from, the polling booths to which they had been assigned.

### **On chasing polling agents**

Under the 1982 Electoral Act, each party is entitled to have two polling agents (to be paid by FEDECO) present at each booth throughout the voting and during the counting as well. This provision had been seen as a major check on potential electoral abuses. In both Kaduna and Bauchi, all five of the opposition parties - the GNPP, NAP, NPP, PRP and UPN - joined together in statements condemning the conduct of the voting. In Kaduna, the five parties declared that they would refuse to accept the results of the presidential election in that state, alleging four specific violations of the Electoral Act. In addition to the refusal to allow most of their polling agents to be present, they objected to:- the conducting of the voting in most areas without the list of registered voters; allowing people not officially registered to vote; and allowing under-age children with fake registration cards to vote. The parties also alleged that voting failed to take place at many polling centres. The allegations of the five parties in Bauchi were still more serious. There, it was claimed that in many areas where voting was not conducted - because electoral materials were not provided - results were still announced. Speaking for the five parties, the UPN gubernatorial candidate, **Alhaji Bappa Ahmed Gombe**, claimed that traditional rulers, the police and electoral officers collaborated to molest, intimidate and chase away non-NPN polling agents.

Similar complaints were registered in other states, including Cross River, where the NPP state chairman charged that election results were announced for polling booths which conducted no polling; Rivers, where the UPN candidate for governor claimed that he and hundreds of his supporters were unable to



vote because their names were not on the voters' list; and Oyo, whose deputy-governor, in a two-hour meeting with FEDECO chairman Justice Ovie-Whiskey alleged that UPN agents were kept from observing the polling at many sites and were driven away from the counting at others. The NPN protested the conduct of the election in Ondo, but by and large its complaints were about inefficiency in electoral administration rather than presumed malpractices.

It would appear that much of the non-voting and late voting about which parties were complaining was randomly distributed, the product of the multiple and mammoth logistical difficulties of staging an election in such a huge and poorly connected country, and in some cases, of simply poor preparation. Hence, after driving around through much of Makurdi before he finally located his name at a polling station far from where he registered, Benue NPN governor Aper Aku declared the election exercise 'a total failure.' Dr. Azikiwe was kept waiting for four hours at his polling station before electoral officials finally arrived with the necessary materials. In Gongola, all six parties criticized FEDECO's handling of the presidential election, which did not begin in some parts of Gongola until 3 p.m. on Saturday, if at all. Some constituencies in Gongola, Borno and Cross River were permitted to vote on Sunday, or even Monday, but there is no doubt that a great many voters were unable to vote in this first election because their names were not on the list or because the polling officials, or the ballot papers, never appeared.

The foul-ups have angered a lot of individual voters and constituencies, but they should not threaten the electoral process itself unless they are seen to be less than random in their distribution. In several states, most notably Plateau and Anambra, it was alleged that areas known to be opposed to the NPN were unduly victimized by late voting, or no voting at all. Certainly the NPN enjoyed good luck: in Imo Shagari scored 25.07% of the vote, whereas Waziri Ibrahim failed by 0.04% to get 25% in his home state of Borno.

As these complaints are mounting, the basis is being laid for a major challenge to the legality, and hence the legitimacy, of the presidential election. With uncharacteristic bitterness, Dr. Azikiwe alleged on the Monday after the voting that FEDECO had deliberately not supplied enough electoral materials to areas in Anambra state where the NPP was known to be strong, and that the NPP symbol was smudged up on the ballot paper to the point where it was difficult to recognize - a complaint that was echoed by NPP officials around the country. Vowing not to congratulate Shagari if he were reelected and to challenge the election in court, he obtained later that day an injunction from an Enugu High Court

restraining FEDECO in Anambra from releasing the state results (which were nevertheless released from Lagos two days later). In a more sweeping statement, Waziri Ibrahim condemned the election as having been 'heavily rigged in the ten northern states.' His party and the UPN alleged that their polling agents were driven from the polls throughout the North.

Given the margin of Shagari's victory, and the probability that each of the three parties inflated their vote to some extent in their areas of strength, it is unlikely that electoral malpractices determined the outcome of the election. But they have soured what would otherwise have been a very encouraging climate, and heightened the tension surrounding the gubernatorial elections last Saturday.

The crucial feature of federalism in modern Nigeria is that it gives each major party a substantial stake in the system. Whatever genuine bitterness the UPN and NPP may feel about the conduct of the presidential election is no doubt tempered by the expectation of the states they retain or win in the gubernatorial elections. Should they score a reasonable share of the success they are looking for at the state level, they will likely confine their challenge on the first round of voting to the courts, and live with the rejections of their appeals.

Should they perceive, however, that many of the states they expected to win were 'robbed' from them due to electoral malpractices, trouble will be bound to burst open in some places. Tension is especially high in Anambra, Oyo, Borno, Kano, Plateau, Benue, and Bendel, where the campaigns have been intensely, and often violently, fought. Many voters perceive the governors as more relevant to their daily lives and the state of their communities than the federal government - certainly the patronage is within easier reach - and hence care more intensely about the outcome of these elections.

### **The gubernatorial round**

At the time of going to press, the NPN has won 12 of the 19 governorships, the UPN three, with the NPP and the PRP one each. Two results remain undeclared - Ondo and Plateau, controlled until now by UPN and NPP governors respectively. The UPN lost Oyo and Bendel to the NPN and gained Kwara from the NPN. The non-declaration of the Ondo result suggests that this state, where the election campaign was especially violent, may also change hands. Other NPN gains were made from the NPP (Anambra), the GNPP (Borno and Gongola) and the PRP (Kaduna). Plateau, an NPP state, is rumoured to have passed into NPN hands, though this seems very surprising, considering the feelings in Plateau against the northern establishment because of the fate which befell prominent Plateau leaders like Gen. Yakuba Gowon and governor Gom-

walk, blame for which is apportioned to the Kaduna Mafia.

The bandwagon effect of the presidential results therefore seems to have proved itself, and Shagari's advisers are no doubt pleased that they agitated for the reversal of the 1979 electoral sequence, when the presidential vote came last. One of last week's surprise winners, Dr Victor Olunloyo, the NPN's candidate for the Oyo State governorship, had explained this to the editorial board of the Lagos-based *Daily Times* before the elections: he had advised his constituents to vote for the PRP gubernatorial candidate in Oyo, he said, in the unlikely event of the PRP

leader Hassan Yusuf winning the presidential mandate. But as he expected Shagari to be successful, he was supporting the NPN, as a reasonable and realistic option. What Olunloyo was saying was that the Yorubas would have to be in political accord with the centre if they wanted their rightful share of the "national cake", regardless of party preference for Awolowo.

There is plenty of evidence that the bandwagon effect influenced the governorship ballot. For instance, two days before the gubernatorial elections,

GNPP candidate Yakubu Nuhu Dan-Yaya in Bauchi state crossed to the NPN. (A few days earlier he had joined the UPN, NPP and PRP leaders who had threatened legal action against FEDECO and the Bauchi state police commissioner for alleged electoral malpractice). In any case Dan-Yaya had little chance of becoming governor of Bauchi, but his belated conversion helped to increase the majority of the NPN incumbent, Tafari Ali. Similarly, the PRP candidate in Bendel State, Victor Obazee, resigned in favour of the NPN's winning Samuel Ogbemudia. Rivers state chairman of the NPP, Chief C D Onke, crossed to the NPN when the presidential results were announced, and PRP senator Usman Alto Dambata - who represented a Kano State constituency - did likewise. (Dambata's political suicide may have been premature, since the Kano governorship was retained by the PRP, with senator Barkin Zuwo winning).

Of course, the bandwagon effect was not the only factor. Ex-governor Abubakar Rimi of Kano, who had stood on the NPP platform and had been genuinely confident of winning, explained the fact that the NPP was third in the presidential results by saying that his supporters still tended to associate him with the PRP. He embarked on a frantic radio/TV campaign between the first and second polls to explain to the electors of Kano that he was no longer associated with the PRP, and that by choosing his old party symbol - the key - they were voting for his opponent and not for him. This may, of course, have been the electorate's wish. But Kano is by far the most populous state and the low turn-out in the

first round - barely 23% - and the admission by Kano FEDECO commissioner, **Hajiya Hassu Iro Imko**, that some of her officials had been "caught" sabotaging FEDECO's efforts, throw doubt on Kano's figures, at least until further statistics are available.

Olunloyo's alleged triumph in Oyo over the very well known incumbent, **Bola Ige**, also has several explanations. Apart from having opted for the "right" party, Olunloyo comes from the Oyo State capital, Ibadan, while Ige comes from Esa-Oke - a town which the people of Ibadan consider to have had more than its fair share of amenities. Kwara fell to the UPN because of the bitter quarrel within the state's NPN and the refusal of Dr Olusola Saraki to endorse the incumbent NPN governor **Adamu Atta**. In the presidential vote, he campaigned for **Shagari**, and the NPN in Kwara did well with 49.25%. Atta's subsequent failure demonstrates Saraki's influence. In view of the divisions within the GNPP, it is not surprising that the two GNPP states, Gongola and Borno, elected NPN governors. There was a last-minute attempt in Gongola to form an alliance between the UPN and NPP, and in Bendel State the two parties entered an agreement signed by the NPP state chairman, **Mrs Ndidì Edewor** and the UPN to vote for the UPN governor, **Ambrose Alli**. (If the NPP gubernatorial candidate, **Chief D A Ewharekuko** did indeed step down, it was not widely publicised).

Now that **Ekwueme** and **Ojukwu** have delivered Anambra to the NPN, the NPP's outlook is unpromising. Much depends on the final Plateau result. Meanwhile **Abubakar Rimi** may reconsider his membership and try to rejoin the PRP rump, which has been given a new intellectual basis with the recent election of the novelist **Chinua Achebe**, a left-wing activist, to the PRP executive.

If the elections continue to go the NPN's way, **Shagari's** suggestion of a unified federal government might meet little opposition, particularly if it is backed by certain undertakings on economic policy. The president has already asked for the resignation of all his ministers and officials, stating that his choice of cabinet colleagues would not necessarily be confined to the NPN. But this is not considered to be a permanent solution. With the NPN in such a powerful position, its policy on allocating top jobs to leaders from different ethnic groups will become more important than ever, particularly regarding the presidency.

This is **Shagari's** last term, and his successor in the NPN must be chosen from "zone B" which means the south. **Ojukwu's** return has reinforced Ibo presidential ambitions, and the ill-disguised hostility

between Ojukwu and Ekwueme is expected to intensify over the question of who was instrumental in "delivering" Anambra state to the NPN. Members of the NPN executive such as Chief Ola Yesufu have already said that a decision has been made to allow the Yorubas the presidential candidacy in 1987, and that this is not negotiable: he specifically referred to suggestions by Ibo leaders that their ability to score higher votes would be a crucial factor in determining this question. Shagari's adviser, Chuba Okadigbo (who is Ibo), on the other hand, maintains that there has never been an agreement that the zone B candidate should automatically be a Yoruba. Okadigbo announced his intention to retire after the elections, but, like many other NPN luminaries, he is thought to be very much in the running himself. If these elections lead to a peaceful conclusion, the decision will be postponed, but only until the next NPN congress. The danger is that the party's leadership will concentrate more on the succession than on the business of running Nigeria.

CSO: 3400/1864



## NIGERIA

### BRIEFS

PRC, USSR CULTURAL AGREEMENTS--Nigeria has signed to separate cultural agreements with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Under the accord, which are of two years durations in each case, Nigeria and the two countries are to explore, promote and strengthen their potentialities to the benefit of their peoples. At the signing ceremony in Lagos, minister of social development, youth and culture, Chief Adebisi Ogedengbe, expressed Nigeria's appreciation to the Soviet Union for the co-operation given her toward the establishment of the iron and steel industry. In the case of China, Chief Ogedengbe suggested that other agreements between the two nations should include industry, economy and culture. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3445, 22 Aug 83 p 1974]

CSO: 3400/1865

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SOME OPPOSITION PARTIES POSSIBLE

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Jul 83 p 5

[Article by Pierre Biarnes: "A Dialog Begins Between the Government and the Opposition"]

[Text] An apparently serious rapprochement, considered improbable as recently as a few weeks ago by most observers, has now begun between President Diouf and the main opposition group, Mr Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party (P.D.S.)

After trying to take charge of a "Rejection Front" and even of an ephemeral "counter-government" the day after the legislative and presidential elections of 25 Feb 83, the results of which they challenged, Mr Wade and his party let it be understood after some time that their eight deputies might give up the idea of boycotting the National Assembly--which they did following their election, following the example of Professor Sheikh Anta Diop, the only elected member from the Democratic National Union (R N D ), another opposition group. The thrice-weekly TAKUSAAN, headed by Mr Farah Ndiaye, Mr Wade's main lieutenant, more and more often published relatively "constructive" criticism of the government's action. More recently, a P D S communique invited the chief of state to organize a "round table" of all the political groups in the country "with none barred." On Monday, 25 July, Mr Wade finally expressed the desire to meet soon with President Diouf, after Mr Wade recalled the day before, still in the columns of TAKUSAAN, in firm and even slightly rigid terms, some of the solutions that he advocates for solving Senegal's economic and financial crisis.

In fact, the P D S party leader is thus responding to a very clear although indirect invitation from Mr Diouf. During an interview Friday with the Foreign Press Association in Senegal, the head of state stated that he regretted that no opposition leader has yet requested an audience since the electoral consultations of the first of the year.

The message seems to have been heard not only by the P D S but also by other opponents, not to mention those persons who, these last few months, were holding back (LE MONDE, 20 July).

## A Broader Cabinet?

The rapprochement now beginning finds its immediate origin in Senegal's serious financial difficulties, which demand, to borrow one of President Diouf's expressions, a "national leap."

But there exist more profound causes for an evolution which, logically, should lead, more or less rapidly, to the setting up, in the first place, of a new government broadened to include the P D S and, probably, several other persons who have remained in the background up until now, and, in the second place, to a broadening of the socialist party in power.

Still dominated by the "barons" of the previous period, the P S does not make room enough, according to Mr Diouf, for the more innovative elements already present in its ranks, which discourages new members from joining. Could its transformation lead to this vast uniting of almost all the political forces in the country, which is more and more the head of state's dream? After seeing the extreme fragmentation of these forces brought about, for two or three years, by the liberalization of Senegalese public life, one is immediately tempted to answer in the affirmative, even if the texts establishing pluripartism should not be called into question.

For diverse reasons (subordinate "fraud" and "sociological influences" always favorable to the government), February's legislative elections have led to an "undiscovered Chamber" which certainly bears no resemblance to what Mr Diouf was in fact hoping for. But, conversely, the opposition could not help but measure the president's popularity. After the return to a strict presidential regime, by doing away with the post of prime minister, which took place in the spring, we could witness the reestablishment of the "dominant unified party" system.

9895

CSO: 3419/1142

## GOVERNMENT TAKING MEASURES TO OVERCOME DROUGHT'S EFFECTS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 3 Aug 83 p 1, 2

[Excerpts] President Abdou Diouf spoke yesterday of his concerns regarding the current agricultural season. The situation in the countryside is indeed cause for concern, as catastrophic weather conditions have inflicted punishing damage on both people and livestock.

As of early August the rains have still not come at all, or they have stopped in those few zones where any was recorded. In some departments, including Bakel, torrential rains caused enormous damage before they stopped, jeopardizing prospects for the renewal of pastureland. A violent duststorm in the department of Linguere decimated hundreds of already weakened cattle and sheep.

The Fleuve and Louga regions have not had any significant rainfall, and in fact some pockets in those regions are still feeling the effects of a drought that began last year.

Thus, a disastrous situation prevails in the northern part of the country and is moving further south each day the rains are delayed.

So far none of the losses are irreversible. The harvests could still all be saved, if the first half of August sees the appearance of those vital, renewing rains for which everyone is praying. There is still hope, and we have no choice but to cling to it. But this is not to ignore the fact that we must face up to realities right now, particularly to relieve the plight of those living in rural areas.

The latter have been hard hit, and they are suffering from shortages of food. City-dwellers have noticed, in recent years, the annual influx of servants coming back from the bush at about this time with reports of idle families in areas where nothing is being grown, where the seedlings have died.

### Peculiar Vultures

Naturally, the livestock situation is tragic. The Ministry of Rural Development estimates that right now some 1.2 million animals are in jeopardy. Indeed, high mortality rates have already been recorded: 10 to 15 percent of the livestock in the Fleuve region and 20 percent in the Louga region. In all, 160,000 head of livestock have already succumbed.

In the north one can see a spectacle of desolation that will linger long in one's memory: a dry land, strewn with a shocking number of rotting carcasses. And those peculiar bipedal vultures--the speculators--are on the prowl. They go from one village to the next, buying all the gaunt, haggard cattle and sheep they can find, paying the discouraged stockmen pitifully low prices. The criminal escapades of these profiteers are threatening to destroy the nation's wealth in livestock!

What can be done to contain the disaster and prepare the rural sector to get back to work if the rains set in? What can be done to save the livestock?

The government has set in motion a vast emergency relief program to deal with these now overriding priorities.

(1) Emergency aid has been appropriated for the rural populations. Since 7 July steps have been taken to distribute 10,000 tons of food staples: 3,000 tons of rice and 7,000 tons of sorghum millet. Additional measures have been planned to tide people over without undue hardship, thus enabling them to get back to work on the fields. The government is also preparing to take broader action if the situation should become worse. Plans have been drawn up.

(2) With regard to livestock, relief efforts have already gotten under way, and the first phase has already cost Fr CFA 1.2 billion.

Measures already taken or under way in this connection are making possible the immediate distribution of 4,000 tons of peanut cake, 130 tons of semolina and 918 tons of various other kinds of feed. In all: more than 5,000 tons of livestock feed.

In addition, livestock feed available in some industrial plans has been requisitioned and set aside for the affected areas. This measure will remain in effect for a month, until it is certain that the pastureland in the north has enough grass.

The head of state has decided that distribution will be carried out without resort to intermediaries directly to the rural communities, in order to maximize the effectiveness of the relief effort and avoid the risk of waste and fraud.

The overall relief program will, it is hoped, eventually be filled out by new donations. Thorough documentation has been prepared for presentation to financial organizations and donors.

9516  
CSO: 3419/1155



## PUBLIC BUS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3446, 29 Aug 83 pp 1999-2001

[Article by Howard Schissel: "Kinshasa's Transport Saga"]

[Text] ZAIRE was considered, until recently, as the African country where the setting up and operating of a public transport system was an impossible mission. Over the past few years, however, this negative attitude has been altered thanks to the success, won against considerable odds, by *Renault Vehicules Industriels* (RVI), an affiliate of the French state-controlled Renault group which specialises in public transport and utility vehicles, and has created a viable network of public transport.

Kinshasa, a sprawling city of almost three million inhabitants, mushrooming at a pace of some eight per cent a year, presents awesome problems in the field of lost cost public transport. Two public transport companies established in the capital by the Zairean government in the mid-1970s, *Office Transport en Commun du Zaire* (OTCZ) and *Société des Transport du Kinshasa* (STK), were victims of the general malaise affecting the economy: a penury of spare parts due to the lack of foreign currency, slack management, over-hiring and an imbalance between supply and demand. Thus, in just a few short years these two companies had been reduced to mere symbolic operations.

At the end of the 1970s, with the transport crisis in Kinshasa becoming worse than ever, Zairean authorities were obliged to act quickly. President Mobutu was fully aware that the lack of public transport in the capital was a factor inhibiting the efficient running of the economy and was likely to contribute to unrest which could threaten the stability of his regime. In 1978 the Zairean leader requested RVI, who already participated in

public transport ventures in Dakar, Abidjan and Douala-Yaoundé, to lend its assistance for the establishment and subsequent operation of a public transport network in Kinshasa as well as the larger urban centres throughout this vast central African state.

In October 1978 the *Société des Transports Zairois* (SOTRAZ) saw the light of day with RVI taking 20 per cent of its equity, the state ten per cent and the state mineral marketing board, *Société Zairoise de Commercialisation* (SOZACOM), the remaining 70 per cent. A major problem remained: how to purchase the first buses to equip the fleet without the foreign currency which was so cruelly lacking in Zaire. An ingenious and controversial solution was found. In the late 1970s, there was a wide difference between the official and spot price for cobalt, one of Zaire's principal exports. RVI proceeded to set up a special company to purchase the cobalt from SOZACOM at official prices and then sold the mineral on the free market at the higher spot price. The difference enabled Zaire to finance the purchase of the first 80 Renault buses. This transaction was denounced in the Blumenthal report, but it seems hard to imagine how SOTRAZ could have been launched without this financial juggling act.

RVI was intent on avoiding the problems which had virtually destroyed the two other bus companies. For example, OTCZ was supplied with 800 British Leyland buses, but its repair installations were designed to service only 250-300 vehicles. The dearth of spare parts meant that the company soon had to start cannibalising its vehicles to maintain a minimum number of

buses in service. By May 1983, OTCZ had practically stopped operations with most of its vehicles laid to rest in an immense bus graveyard in the Kinshasa suburbs.

STK, for its part, was equipped with Mercedes buses. The same conditions produced the same results. West German technical assistants dismembered the vehicles until there was practically nothing left. By the summer of 1983, STK had no buses in service but a staff of 700 employees which continued to be paid by the government. Around its garage is the same picture of desolation with hundreds of wrecked and stripped buses littering the grounds.

## Survey undertaken

The collapse of public transport opened the door to abuses from the private or "informal" sector. Not only was overcrowding a problem and safety unguaranteed due to lack of maintenance, but also the price of transport and the lines operated were at the mercy of a small group of individuals whose principal motive was to maximise profits. A study by the *Agence Française de Coopération et Aménagement* showed that there was in operation in Kinshasa at the beginning of this year 435 *fula-fula*, lorries over four tonnes equipped to transport passengers, 869 *Kimalu-malu* small utility vehicles fitted out for public transport, and mini-buses, and five regular buses owned by private individuals. This figure of 1,309 vehicles for the private sector is probably an underestimate for the French study was carried out during a shortage of petrol and a total of around 2,000 is probably closer to reality. French experts discovered, for instance, that eight per cent of the proprietors possessed 21 per cent of the *fula-fulas* and 79 per cent of the *kimalu-malu* and mini-buses.

SOTRAZ's role was also to help moralise the public transport sector by assuring a viable alternative to the private transporters. Today in Kinshasa fundamental changes have taken place as the population now familiarly says "to take SOTRAZ" instead of "take the bus". Of course, SOTRAZ cannot fulfill Kinshasa's total transport needs, especially in peripheral areas without tarmac, but it has become the backbone of the city's transport system.

The French study of transport in Kinshasa was able to broadly estimate the number of trips made by the population

during a working day. Of the 2.2 million daily trips in Kinshasa a quarter are for work, half for schooling and the remainder for various other reasons. Of this total, individual motor vehicles account for 15 per cent, collective means of transport and taxis 45 per cent, and the rest take place on foot. SOTRAZ at present handles about half the 1.2 million trips made every day in collective vehicles.

The 300,000 passengers who use SOTRAZ vehicles on a daily basis place great strain on the buses for overcrowding is difficult to avoid and the sorry state of city roads increases wear and tear. The International Monetary Fund estimated that it was unlikely that a bus's active life in Kinshasa could exceed two years. SOTRAZ accomplished a feat by keeping its vehicles running for over three years.

This is no miracle, but the result of a rigorous programme of maintenance and driver training. SOTRAZ remains bedevilled by the difficulty of procuring spare parts from abroad, and the extremely limited number of parts which local manufacturers can supply (2 to 3 per cent at maximum). Thus between 70 and 80 per cent of the spare parts must be machined or reconditioned in its own workshops. Even with this extraordinary effort, up to a third of its vehicles are immobilised at any one time.

RVI's watchword in Zaire is flexibility and innovation, for a public transport company cannot be run in the country along the lines established in Western Europe. For instance, around 60 per cent of SOTRAZ's operating expenditure is on spare parts, while only 20 per cent is allocated for salaries of the company's 3,900 employees.

Likewise RVI must adapt its material to African needs. In the developed countries the cost of labour is so high that most urban transport firms have sought to have buses manned only by a driver, with most of the tickets being sold beforehand. In Africa, on the other hand, two agents equip the buses, one in the rear collecting fares. The buses, therefore, have to be adapted to this mode of functioning. In addition, sophisticated gadgets and sensitive parts which characterise European buses are simply not adapted to the African environment. Buses must thereby be robust and easy to maintain.

Earlier this year, the Zairean government allowed SOTRAZ to raise the price of its ticket from Z1.5 to Z2.5, following an

18-month freeze. For non-salaried people, the cost of a ticket is often prohibitive, but for those working in the modern sector the cost of transport is paid for by the employer. If the government subsidised the price of urban transport then the demand would be even higher and the conditions, already arduous, would soon become unbearable. So pricing policies were structured to facilitate travel for workers and employees as well as students. SOTRAZ, in fact, is one of the rare public transport companies in the world to turn a profit. This avoids the need for the Zaire government to cover any financial losses. In the Ivory Coast, for example, the government is obliged to grant an annual CFA8 billion subsidy for Abidjan's SOTRA.

In Kinshasa, SOTRAZ at present boasts 250 buses covering 21 different lines totalling 440km.; it transports 120 million passengers a year and chalks up 20 million km. of road transport. SOTRAZ has also started up, on government request, a small fleet of 50 taxis in the capital to moralise the market and set standards which oblige the private taxis to improve their operations.

The second focal point of SOTRAZ's activity is Lubumbashi in Shaba province, where it operates 50 buses on seven lines covering 100km. Mini-buses are in service at SOTRAZ centres in the hinterland: it has smaller networks in Bandundu, Kananaga, Kisangani, Matadi, Mbandaka and Mbuje-Maye. Finally, SOTRAZ has set up an inter-city service between Kinshasa and the port of Matadi, Kinshasa and Kikwit, and Lubumbashi and Kolwezi.

CSO: 3400/1863

# WATER SHORTAGE IN NDOLA RURAL REACHES 'ALARMING PROPORTIONS'

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 1 Sep 83 p 5

[Text]

THE water shortage in Ndola Rural has reached alarming proportions and is now threatening livestock at the Masaiti Boma Farm Institute.

The drought which hit the area a month ago has been caused by low water levels in streams following poor rainfall last season and there is near panic among officials at the institute.

District governor Mr Stephen Longwani yesterday rushed to the college to assess the situation.

The district executive secretary Mr Lemmy Shanduka confirmed the crisis and said the council was considering sinking two boreholes at the institute and the boma where people depended on piped water.

The college was at a disadvantage as it was built on high ground and it was difficult for water which is at its lowest level in the Kafulafuta stream to go up.

Mr Shanduka would not discuss the problem further and referred the matter to Mr Longwani.

But institute principal Mr Mark Lungu feared that thousands of chickens, guinea fowls, ducks, pigs and cattle may die because of lack of water.

The situation is critical for pigs and chickens which, according to Mr Lungu,

need more water to survive.

He said animals and birds may die if the situation was not rectified soon.

When news about the drought first came to light, Mr Longwani promised to send a team of officials from the development secretary's department to compile a report before action could be taken.

The governor intimated then that some water wells in nearby villages would be deepened and that estimates for the programme would be known after assessment.

In Kitwe, two main streams at the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) Mukuba farm which provide water for livestock have dried up, reports Zana.

MUZ chairman Mr Timothy Walamba said yesterday the farm management had taken steps to counteract any adverse effects on animals resulting from drought by ensuring that all boreholes were being used.

# MUNDIA OPENS WORKSHOP IN LUSAKA ON BIOGAS SYSTEMS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 31 Aug 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

**DEVELOPING countries need energy much more than developed ones because of the large industrialisation process the former still have to take in their advance towards social and economic development.**

Prime Minister Mundia said this in Lusaka when he opened an international training workshop on biogas systems at the National Council for Scientific Research.

But he reminded the delegates drawn from various countries in the Eastern and Southern African region of the high cost of energy at the moment.

It was with this in mind that developing countries should do all they can to develop alternative and cheaper sources of energy for their development programmes.

Mr Mundia said Africa was endowed with both renewable and non-renewable energy sources, including the greater hydro-electric potential.

## Absence

But the continent's major problem was the absence of local skills, technology and investment to exploit those resources.

"We are particularly lacking in technology and investment to exploit the fossil energy sources and our greater hydro-electric power potential," he said.

And to exploit such resources requires the purchase

of technology and the borrowing of investment money from industrialised countries and that has not been an easy thing.

Mr Mundia said the oil crisis had brought into focus the worldwide realisation of the "finite nature" of fossil energy sources and had, therefore, sparked greater consideration for renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, tidal, biogas and smaller hydro-power generation stations.

He said the gaseous energy realised could be utilised for cooking and lighting.

And if produced on a large scale, it could be used as a motive power in small-scale industrial production and the fertiliser produced would supplement the growing need for artificial fertiliser.

The use of this gas technology would also minimise the destruction of forest which were at the moment a major source of energy, especially among the people in the rural areas.

Mr Mundia said apart from these advantages, the use of biogas, obtained from human or animal waste, would also promote social hygiene in that the waste matter would be collected with the realisation that it was for a useful purpose.

"This will, therefore, help to solve in a useful manner, the sanitary problem," he said.



SOLDIERS PLACED ALONG NDOLA-MUFULIRA ROAD TO MINIMIZE ROBBERIES

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 30 Aug 83 p 1

[Text]

ARMY personnel have been deployed along the notorious Ndola-Mufulira road to minimize highway robberies which have been on the increase there recently.

A Times of Zambia reporter who travelled on the road yesterday found three checkpoints being manned by soldiers.

The army personnel roadblocks are in addition to three others mounted jointly by immigration, customs and the policemen.

There has been an increase in the number of robberies in which people have lost property including vehicles to gunmen suspected to come from a neighbouring country.

But since the weekend motorists and passengers using public transport are being ordered to come out of the vehicles, line up for identification, have their vehicles searched and languages they speak known.

But when contacted Copperbelt police chief Mr Julius Zulu denied knowledge of the presence of army personnel, saying, "I am sorry I don't know anything about it."

Two weeks ago, Mr Zulu called for the deployment of

the army on the Zambia-Zaire border.

The police chief made the call because of continuing harassment of motorists despite intensified police patrols.

Mr Zulu advised motorists travelling to and from Mufulira at night to use the dual carriage way via Kitwe.

But Minister of Home Affairs Mr Frederick Chomba said the crime situation in Zambia did not warrant the army being deployed to supplement police efforts.

**ILLEGAL CURRENCY EXCHANGE BETWEEN ZAMBIANS-ZIMBABWEANS 'RIFE'**

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 30 Aug 83 p 7

[Excerpt]

**ILLEGAL** currency exchange between Zambians and Zimbabweans at the Livingstone railway station is rife and the illicit transaction is causing concern to the police in the area.

Southern Province police chief Mr Basil Chibula confirmed the racket which is believed to be a sequel to the withdrawal of the holiday allowance by Zambian authorities.

Zambians are using the money to buy essential commodities across the border.

Passenger train services between Zambia and Zimbabwe resumed last July — ten years after the Rhodesian minority regime of Ian Smith closed the border between the two countries.

Zambians are not allowed to cross into Zimbabwe without at least five Zimbabwean dollars with them although they are able to buy return train tickets.

Mr Chibula said the illegal currency exchange had created operational difficulties for police and customs officers.

**Resumption**

But observers said it was a problem which authorities of both countries should have thought of when they planned the resumption of the passenger train services.

"How do you expect passengers of both countries to travel on the train without the necessary and appropriate currency?" asked one traveller.

CSO: 3400/1858

**ZCCM OFFICIAL ANNOUNCES INCREASED SALARIES FOR ZCCM MEMBERS**

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 1 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by George Makulu]

[Excerpt]

**MINERS** in all divisions of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) will receive increased salaries today, Chairman and Chief Executive Francis Kaunda announced in Kitwe yesterday.

This follows the approval of the recently-signed collective agreement by the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and the Prices and Incomes Commission.

Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) chairman Timothy Walamba later said that his members would today receive salary increases ranging from ten to 65 per cent.

Mr Walamba thanked ZCCM for agreeing to the union's proposals and explained that the lowly-paid miners would get the highest increases.

**Miners in the G 1 and G 2 grades would receive increments of ten percent while the middle groups in grades three and four would get 25 per cent and those in group G 5 to eight would receive 65 per cent increases.**

The MUZ boss described the new salary deal as an achievement for all, given the unfavourable economic situation the country is going through.

He said: "I am very happy that the mine management accepted our proposals. Our good industrial harmony will definitely be maintained. It is an achievement in view of the prevailing situation of the country."

Mr Walamba also said it was not easy to clinch a salary increment deal under Zambia's current economic problems.

Mr Kaunda made the announcement at Nkana Stadium where he presented awards to 1,188 miners who have clocked 20 years in the industry.

He told the colourful ceremony attended by hundreds of miners and their families, that the management had been overwhelmed at the way ZCCM employees had responded to the cost-saving exercise which was intended to save the company from collapse.

It was in appreciation of this that the management agreed to the Mineworkers Union of Zambia's request to negotiate a new collective agreement long before the expiry of the old one.

"I am happy to inform you that the new two-year agreement, to take effect from August 1 has already been approved by both the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and the Prices and Incomes Commission.

"This means that eligible employees will receive increased salaries in their pay packets today, September 1," he said.

It was only last week that an announcement was made that agreement on a new collective agreement had been reached and that this would be implemented as soon as it was approved by the Prices and Incomes Commission.

Mr Kaunda told the miners that there was no denying that the mining industry had been experiencing a lot of financial difficulties for sometime due to poor copper prices.

It was because of these problems that management was forced to introduce cost-saving measures in order to save the company from collapse and to secure jobs.

"I must say that I have been overwhelmed by the favourable way all employees in the company responded to the successful implementation of these measures," the chairman said.

Mr Kaunda said the "praise-worthy" achievement had been possible because everyone had stood together as members of one family would in times of difficulty.

The management's response to the workers' spirit of sacrifice, would be to continue to do everything possible to improve the company's financial performance so that results of labour could be meaningfully reflected in better conditions of service for all employees and higher revenue for the whole country.

# GOMA SAYS NATION BENEFITS ENORMOUSLY FROM INDIAN COOPERATION

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 1 Sep 83 p 1

[Text]

FOREIGN Affairs Minister Professor Cameck Goma has said Zambia benefited and continues to benefit enormously from its co-operation with India.

Speaking when he hosted a farewell luncheon for outgoing Indian High Commissioner to Zambia Mr Amar Nath Ram at Pamodzi Hotel yesterday, Prof. Goma said India significantly assisted and continued to assist Zambia in various areas of human endeavour in the quest to secure real national development.

The minister said Zambia very much values its friendship with India and thanked Mr Ram for the part he has played in consolidating it.

Goma emphasised that developing countries like Zambia and India need peace and stability to reconstruct their economies and to secure national development.

He said it was against this background that Zambia is very much delighted that the Non-Aligned Movement is currently under the leadership of India.

The minister pointed out that

India firmly stands counted on the side of the struggling masses of South Africa and Namibia in their fight to free themselves from the stranglehold of fierce, brutal, racist and monstrous apartheid regime of South Africa.

He added that the hard struggle for India's independence waged by the great Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders of the Indian National Congress provided an inspiration to many free African countries in their struggle for national independence.

And in reply, Mr Ram said Prof. Goma was right to underscore the friendship between the two countries which he said should be for mutual advancement.

The High Commissioner said his country was looking forward to receiving President Kaunda when he attends the Commonwealth heads of state summit in November. — ZANA



KAUNDA SCORES FISCAL INDISCIPLINE IN NATIONAL MISSIONS ABROAD

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 1 Sep 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

**P R E S I D E N T**  
**Kaunda yesterday sharply spoke out against financial indiscipline in Zambian missions abroad and called for high standards of personal discipline among diplomats.**

Zambian embassies should place greater emphasis on their economic functions which included finding investors and markets for Zambian products.

He told a seminar for heads of the Zambian missions at Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, that he had for a long time been concerned about unconstitutional and unauthorised expenditure at embassies.

The revelations of the Auditor-General's report portrayed a bad image of the Zambian foreign service and reflected a complete disregard for financial regulations.

"This must stop. In future, I want all heads of missions to observe expenditure limits. If there should be problems let them be known to your ministry and ask for assistance on

how to solve them," the President said.

Dr Kaunda said with immediate effect appointments to the foreign service would be based on merit.

Foreign service officers should understand that they were in their jobs abroad as Zambians and not because of their tribes.

"I don't want to hear of any misunderstanding among officers based on tribalism or any other reason. You must work as a team — as one Zambian community."

He called for a high sense of professionalism among diplomats based on sound knowledge of administration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in missions.

The conduct of successful foreign policy must be based on high standards of discipline and maturity of all officers.

It was vital for heads of missions to inculcate the best discipline in all their subordinates.

"Anyone who misconducts himself or herself in any way must be dealt with firmly. His or her continued stay in the foreign service must be reviewed."

He said time had come for embassies to play a full role in advancing the economic life of Zambia.

In the past missions concentrated on political issues but now they should be economically productive as well.

## BRIEFS

**JAPANESE VETERINARY SCHOOL GRANT**--Japan yesterday granted Zambia K13.1 million aid to establish a school of veterinary medicine at the University of Zambia. Speaking at the signing ceremony in Lusaka Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Lameck Goma, told Japanese ambassador to Zambia Mr. Eiji Seki that Japanese aid to Zambia showed the strong cooperation between the two countries. "The establishment of the school of veterinary medicine in the country will help Zambia train its own manpower at university level which the country is lacking at present," Prof Goma said. The grant will be in two categories--K12.6 million will be used to establish the school while the remaining amount will be used for the execution of the project for disseminating agricultural technology. The school will comprise an administration block, a veterinary studies building, another for disease control and clinical studies and other supplementary facilities. The aid to the project for disseminating agricultural technology, includes a four-wheel-drive vehicle and film projectors. [Text] [Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 31 Aug 83 p 1]

**THREE EXPATRIATE MINERS FIRED**--Three expatriate miners at the Kabwe Division of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines have been fired for alleged economic sabotage, highly placed company sources told the Times yesterday. The men, said to be directors of some private firms, are alleged to have been illegally ordering heavy equipment and materials on company local purchase orders to build their firms. They were also alleged to have been using company drawings and plans at great expense for building their private firms in Kabwe which sources said include a church. "The equipment, materials, plans and drawings are worth millions of Kwacha which the company lost through them," the sources said. Following these revelations, the mine police launched investigations and submitted a report to the divisional general manager, Dr David Shutt. After getting a wind of it, members of the Party committee launched a probe independent and submitted their report to Kabwe Urban governor, Mr Raphael Mapulanga. [Text] [Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 30 Aug 83 p 1]

CSO: 3400/1858

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

Sept. 21, 1983